[smime] New ID of possible interest
"Herzog, Jonathan - 0668 - MITLL" <jherzog@ll.mit.edu> Thu, 21 April 2011 14:09 UTC
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From: "Herzog, Jonathan - 0668 - MITLL" <jherzog@ll.mit.edu>
To: "smime@ietf.org" <smime@ietf.org>
Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2011 10:09:21 -0400
Thread-Topic: New ID of possible interest
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Cc: "Khazan, Roger - 0668 - MITLL" <rkh@ll.mit.edu>, "draft-herzog-withmac-keywrap@tools.ietf.org" <draft-herzog-withmac-keywrap@tools.ietf.org>
Subject: [smime] New ID of possible interest
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I would like to inform the SMIME working group of a newly-submitted Internet Draft that may be of interest: The With-MAC key-wrapping algorithm for Cryptographic Message Syntax draft-herzog-withmac-keywrap-00 Abstract: This document describes a new key-wrapping algorithm to be used in the EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData structures of the Cryptographic Message Syntax. Because these structures do not provide data-origin authentication, a recipient cannot cryptographically verify that the plaintext received was the plaintext encapsulated by the message's original sender. The With- MAC key-wrapping algorithm allows an EncryptedKey value to hold both a wrapped symmetric key and a MAC value on the data to be authenticated. When used in EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData structures, therefore, these structures can achieve data-origin authentication (in some circumstances) using only symmetric-key algorithms. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-herzog-withmac-keywrap/ A side note: this draft should probably be read in combination with our previous draft on static-static ECDH (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-herzog-static-ecdh/). That draft described how a sender might use a certified ECDH key to create an EnvelopedData structure (for example). It is unclear, however, how such a sender could also provide data-origin authentication without using digital signatures. However, that requires a certified signature-capable key, something they may not have. This draft provides an alternate approach-- the sender provides a MAC value for each recipient. We welcome all comments and reviews. Thank you. -- Jonathan Herzog voice: (781) 981-2356 Technical Staff fax: (781) 981-7687 Cyber Systems and Technology Group email: jherzog@ll.mit.edu MIT Lincoln Laboratory www: http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/ 244 Wood Street Lexington, MA 02420-9185
- [smime] New ID of possible interest Herzog, Jonathan - 0668 - MITLL