Re: SNMPv2 security
Frank Kastenholz <kasten@tri-flow.ftp.com> Fri, 28 January 1994 22:58 UTC
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Date: Fri, 28 Jan 1994 17:22:12 -0500
Message-Id: <9401282222.AA05331@tri-flow.ftp.com.ftp.com>
To: adam@kbss.bt.co.uk
Subject: Re: SNMPv2 security
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From: Frank Kastenholz <kasten@tri-flow.ftp.com>
Reply-To: kasten@ftp.com
Cc: snmp@psi.com, snmpv2@magellan.tis.com
Content-Length: 2047
> > The whole point of this exercise is to remove the mandated need for > > DES -- that is, to remove the Priv. The intent of this scheme is to > > provide a way to distribute and update Auth keys without requiring an > > encryption algorithm (like DES) which would run afoul of various > > export laws. In this context, your statement is a nonsense. > > Given that the DES algorithms are now freely available to all outside > the states is this an issue anymore? Perhaps some european suppliers As far as US law goes, the fact that DES software is available outside the US is irrelevant. I believe that the DES specification was available to anyone who asked. Here's an example of how the legalistic/bureaucratic mind can work: 2 or three years ago, as Russia (it might have been the USSR then) was trying to find commercial purchasers of some of the technology that they developed for their space program, they brought a small nuclear reactor to the US to show it off to some prospective customers. When it came time for them to go back to Russia, they were stopped at our (the US) border by our customs people who politely and firmly told them that it was illegal to export the reactor. The Russians, and high-level Americans, all protested that the reactor was made by the Russians, in Russia and obviously represented technology that the Russians had (since they made the silly thing). The customs people listened very carefully and then said that it didn't matter where the reactor was made or who made it, the law said "Thou Shalt Not Export Reactors" and that was that -- and customs then impounded the reactor. Eventually it took an act of Congress to make it legal to export that specific reactor (Model such-and-such, color so-and-so, size foo-by-bar, serial number mumble and so on) to its owners. To apply this story to our situation, do a global search-and-replace from "reactor" to "code containing cryptologic technology". -- Frank Kastenholz FTP Software 2 High Street North Andover, Mass. USA 01845 (508)685-4000
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