[Spasm] draft-housley-spasm-eku-constraints-03.txt

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Thu, 26 May 2016 20:52 UTC

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Thu, 26 May 2016 16:52:41 -0400
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Subject: [Spasm] draft-housley-spasm-eku-constraints-03.txt
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This just fixes the ASN.1 mistake in the version that was posted yesterday.

Russ


> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-housley-spasm-eku-constraints-03.txt
> Date: May 26, 2016 at 4:51:32 PM EDT
> To: "Russ Housley" <housley@vigilsec.com>, "Russell Housley" <housley@vigilsec.com>
> 
> 
> A new version of I-D, draft-housley-spasm-eku-constraints-03.txt
> has been successfully submitted by Russell Housley and posted to the
> IETF repository.
> 
> Name:		draft-housley-spasm-eku-constraints
> Revision:	03
> Title:		Extended Key Usage Constraints
> Document date:	2016-05-26
> Group:		Individual Submission
> Pages:		9
> URL:            https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-housley-spasm-eku-constraints-03.txt
> Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-housley-spasm-eku-constraints/
> Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-housley-spasm-eku-constraints-03
> Diff:           https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-housley-spasm-eku-constraints-03
> 
> Abstract:
>   This document specifies the extended key usage constraints
>   certificate extension, which is used to place restrictions on the key
>   purpose identifiers that are authorized to appear in the end-entity
>   certificate in a certification path.  Restrictions apply to the
>   extended key usage certificate extension, which is described in
>   RFC 5280.