[lamps] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC9399 (7534)

RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> Mon, 05 June 2023 17:30 UTC

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Date: Mon, 05 Jun 2023 10:30:13 -0700
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Subject: [lamps] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC9399 (7534)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC9399,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Logotypes in X.509 Certificates".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid7534

--------------------------------------
Type: Editorial
Reported by: Preston Locke <preston@letsencrypt.org>

Section: 6

Original Text
-------------
   After a certification path is successfully validated, the replying
   party trusts the information that the CA includes in the certificate,
   including any certificate extensions.

Corrected Text
--------------
   After a certification path is successfully validated, the relying
   party trusts the information that the CA includes in the certificate,
   including any certificate extensions.

Notes
-----
The phrase "replying party" is a typo and should be "relying party"

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-------------
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--------------------------------------
RFC9399 (draft-ietf-lamps-rfc3709bis-10)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Logotypes in X.509 Certificates
Publication Date    : May 2023
Author(s)           : S. Santesson, R. Housley, T. Freeman, L. Rosenthol
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG