Re: [SPICE] Revised Charter
Orie Steele <orie@transmute.industries> Wed, 07 February 2024 15:04 UTC
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From: Orie Steele <orie@transmute.industries>
Date: Wed, 07 Feb 2024 09:03:54 -0600
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To: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>
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Subject: Re: [SPICE] Revised Charter
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Roman, Henk, Mike and Orie have addressed your feedback, the current charter, reflecting our changes based on your feedback can be found here: https://github.com/transmute-industries/ietf-spice-charter/blob/main/charter.md We think the charter is ready for community review, but less us know if you have further changes to suggest. Regards, OS On Wed, Feb 7, 2024 at 8:34 AM Michael Prorock <mprorock@mesur.io> wrote: > I have pulled those suggestions into a PR here: > https://github.com/transmute-industries/ietf-spice-charter/pull/23 > > Mike Prorock > CTO, Founder > https://mesur.io/ > > > > On Tue, Feb 6, 2024 at 12:20 PM Michael Prorock <mprorock@mesur.io> wrote: > >> Thanks Roman, >> That google doc is extremely helpful. >> >> Orie (and list) I will take a stab at a PR that reflects this feedback. >> >> Mike Prorock >> CTO, Founder >> https://mesur.io/ >> >> >> >> On Tue, Feb 6, 2024 at 11:52 AM Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org> wrote: >> >>> Hi! >>> >>> >>> >>> Thanks so much for this PR and the related discussion. I have a bit >>> more feedback: >>> >>> >>> >>> (1) Editorially, this overall charter text is too long and includes >>> things that I don’t believe help constrain the scope. I wanted to be >>> constructive with a proposal but I didn’t know how to best convey proposed >>> editorial changes on a PR with an explanation. I made a GDoc with track >>> changes/suggestions, >>> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1mmaB4Ll8jEpgmuoGNLwks51Set5yxLX7Cc3btq4q_9k/edit?usp=sharing. >>> If this is not usable, I can find a different way to pass along the changes. >>> >>> >>> >>> A few motivating ideas include reducing the background and reducing the >>> number of times parts of the architecture defined. I also proposed the >>> removal of all individual documents as I wasn’t sure how “related >>> documents” helped narrow the scope. >>> >>> >>> >>> (2) The “Goals” section includes a long list of “topics will be >>> considered in the milestones”. While I can see how these would be >>> important properties of digital credentials, it wasn’t clear to me who they >>> constrain the future solution. For example: >>> >>> >>> >>> -- What does "consider" mean? Using a dictionary definition, "consider" >>> means the solution wouldn't have to deliver any of these properties. >>> >>> >>> >>> -- Are these properties going to be provided by unique specifications >>> produced by the WG? >>> >>> >>> >>> -- These topics are described in a level of detail that would make it >>> challenging to assess whether the property was realized. For example, >>> "Confidentiality (ensuring information is protected from unauthorized >>> access" is the textbook definition of confidentiality. What is >>> "unauthorized" in the context of the architecture framed above? >>> "Availability (efficiently information processing, minimizing data in >>> flight ...", what's "efficient enough", how many bits "in flight" is too >>> many or few? >>> >>> >>> >>> I wonder if this list could be much shorter? Perhaps some reduced set >>> of properties can be woven in the text to describe the desired framework. >>> >>> >>> >>> (3) Per the “Meta Discovery”: >>> >>> >>> >>> -- As design guidance or constraining the solution space, the current >>> text would benefit from refinement. It doesn't commit to HTTP; or define >>> or commit to supporting constrained device >>> >>> >>> >>> -- Per the link draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc, my superficial read of the >>> abstract suggests that it is a “data format”. Is that work that will be >>> done here too? I’m confused primarily because the current charter text >>> talks about HTTP and device types but the OAuth document seems more >>> concrete on the support token type, omits the protocol and device types >>> >>> >>> >>> -- Per the “not limited to JSON”, what ecosystem does this text intend >>> to support? Is it only the artifact described in the “selective disclosure >>> of claims” program of work? >>> >>> >>> >>> (4) Per the “Selective Disclosure of Claims”, I had trouble >>> understanding what kind of solution is being described. Specifically, I >>> wasn’t sure what underlying technologies were being built on. >>> >>> >>> >>> -- JOSE/COSE was mentioned in the “Goals/In Scope” section. Is that a >>> dependency? >>> >>> >>> >>> -- Is this deliverable defining new token format? Augmenting the CWT >>> claim registry? Adding claims into the COSE registries? CBOR tags? >>> >>> >>> >>> -- The existing JOSE charter ( >>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/jose/about/) already has in scope: >>> >>> >>> >>> -- "Standards Track document(s) specifying representation(s) of >>> JSON-based claims and/or proofs enabling selective disclosure of these >>> claims and/or proofs, and that also aims to prevent the ability to >>> correlate by different verifiers." >>> >>> -- Standards Track document(s) defining CBOR-based representations >>> corresponding to all the above, building upon the COSE and CWT >>> specifications in the same way that the above build on JOSE and JWT. >>> >>> >>> >>> In what way will this selective disclosure document be different from a >>> JWP? >>> >>> >>> >>> -- Is this work going to profile other/existing token formats to >>> describe how to extend/augment them into being digital credentials? Put >>> into another way, is this working going to specify a new “envelope” for >>> selective disclosure of claims (e.g., alternative to JWP), or is it going >>> to profile/reuse an “envelope” (e.g., JWP) described elsewhere and provide >>> guidance on how specific industries can add their own claims into it to >>> construct digital credential? >>> >>> >>> >>> (5) Editorial. In whatever way this program of work text is refined, >>> that needs to be summarized back in the “Goals” section. >>> >>> >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Roman >>> >>> >>> >>> *From:* Orie Steele <orie@transmute.industries> >>> *Sent:* Friday, January 19, 2024 2:05 PM >>> *To:* Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org> >>> *Cc:* spice@ietf.org >>> *Subject:* Re: [SPICE] Revised Charter >>> >>> >>> >>> Roman, >>> >>> Thank you for your detailed comments. >>> >>> I have raised this PR which I believe addresses all of them: >>> >>> https://github.com/transmute-industries/ietf-spice-charter/pull/22 >>> >>> However, some of your comments are questions, which I feel it is better >>> to answer on the list, in case no text change is needed to address them. >>> >>> Inline for the rest: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Jan 18, 2024 at 4:44 PM Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org> wrote: >>> >>> Hi! >>> >>> >>> >>> Thanks for all of the iteration to get to this text. I have a few >>> questions and comments. >>> >>> >>> >>> ** Per the “Background” Section: >>> >>> >>> >>> -- “Some sets of claim names are registered with IANA and originate from >>> the IETF, OIDF and other standards organizations.” >>> >>> >>> >>> o Editorially, at no point in the text so far has there been any link >>> made between “sets of claims” and a “digital credential”. The introductory >>> paragraph talks about “values” and “attributes” of claims. I recommend >>> some bridging text. >>> >>> >>> >>> I have added some text to the introduction to address this. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> o As a reader, I’m not sure why I am being told this detail. No >>> subsequent text in the deliverables mentions that claims from other SDOs >>> need to be used or that they are being built upon. >>> >>> >>> I added references to the existing registries, and highlighted that JWT >>> claims focus on people, whereas many of the CWT claims focus on devices. >>> >>> The background context for this is that we think that organizations >>> other than the IETF, will likely need to describe claims, because a single >>> global registry won't fit all of them... and would likely overwhelm the >>> designated experts who might not be able to evaluate if a new claim in >>> needed for every element in the periodic table, or for every organic >>> chemistry molecule, or for claims specific to a regional government. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- “IETF and IRTF working groups have developed foundational building >>> blocks with BBS Signatures, RSA Blind Signatures, Verifiable Random >>> Functions, or other Selective-Disclosure and collection limitation >>> techniques.” >>> >>> >>> >>> o Editorial nit. IRTF doesn’t have WGs, it has research groups. The >>> IESG will flag this. >>> >>> >>> Thanks, I have clarified that IRTF has research groups. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> o There are assertions of foundational building blocks but the text >>> doesn’t narrative how this work would build on them. One can infer that >>> BBS/VRF/etc are the crypto that will be used. The IETF WG references of >>> “Selective-Disclosure” and “collection limitation techniques” is what? >>> Recommend either citing WGs or RFC/drafts if this link is important. >>> >>> >>> I have added citations. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> o I’m trying to keep the IETF/IRTF lanes clear. Coordination with CFRG >>> is noted later. Is there coordination, or reuse? What planned activities >>> in this WG would alter the course of CFRG? >>> >>> >>> I clarified how we think SPICE will consume work from CRFG, and how we >>> might provide comments on use cases, for example: >>> >>> A use case for BBS Blind Signatures is privacy preserving credentials, >>> such as proving that a human passed a captcha previously and should not be >>> challenged again, like is done with privacy pass. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ** Per the “Key Design Properties of Digital Credentials” section >>> >>> >>> >>> -- What is the intended use of this section? In what way does this text >>> scope the planned work? For example, will the WG deliver some version of >>> those as part of the “A document specifying the selective disclosure of >>> claims in a secure and privacy-friendly manner”? Are those related to the >>> planned architecture deliverable?) >>> >>> >>> Yes, these are essentially topics we think the architecture will >>> address, and that SOME credential formats can support. >>> >>> There has been a lot of discussion about limiting credential formats to >>> just the ones that can do all of these (SPICE will only work on BBS >>> verifier-verifier unlinkable hardware isolated TEE credentials), but that >>> position does not have consensus in my opinion. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- I’m a little confused by the framing of this section as being able >>> design properties of “digital credentials” but the >>> “In-Scope”/”Goal”/”Deliverable” sections aren’t linked to digital >>> credentials. Some editorial bridging is needed. >>> >>> >>> I hope I have addressed this. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ** Strongly recommend merging “In-Scope” and “Goals” sections. Move the >>> text currently in Goals to the end of the current “In Scope” text (i.e., >>> reverse the order). Editorially, charters typically first say what they >>> will do and then describe who they will work with. >>> >>> >>> Done. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ** Per the “Goals” >>> >>> >>> >>> -- Per the text “Additionally, the SPICE WG will coordinate with other >>> SDOs, such as ISO or W3C, on data model elements or protocols needed to >>> support existing credential use cases” >>> >>> >>> >>> o what is the thinking behind “support existing credential use cases”? >>> Are these new design goals? >>> >>> >>> An example of an existing digital credential could be the identity >>> credential based on SD-JWT or ISO mDoc described here: >>> >>> - https://github.com/WICG/identity-credential >>> >>> If SPICE develops SD-CWT, we would hope that it was influenced by the >>> work that it is attempting to improve on. >>> >>> However, unlike WIMSE, we are not trying to make a credential that is >>> "only for workloads" or "only for people". >>> >>> As an analogy, WIMSE credentials being "only for workloads" are inspired >>> by attempts to use "JWT and DPoP" which are similarly an >>> "existing credential use case". >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> o I observe that ISO is a very BIG organization. IETF even has multiple >>> liaisons for subsets of ISO. Can this text be more specific about the >>> relevant links? >>> >>> >>> I removed direct references to other organizations, which I imagine >>> might raise new objections however I will counter with this argument: >>> >>> Unless you are an active member of those organizations, and those >>> organizations are building digital credentials, and you are contributing to >>> both groups, I don't see a lot of value in calling out that the >>> organizations exist. >>> >>> I think Manu Fontaine has been most vocal on the desire to reference TCG >>> and CCC, but I don't understand how he plans to coordinate SPICE related >>> deliverables (as described in the charter) with those groups, so I will let >>> him argue to add this back : ) >>> >>> Similarly Denis has mentioned ISO, I am not aware of anyone who is >>> actively contributing to the ISO work on mDoc / mobile drivers licenses / >>> covid vaccinations that is also planning to contribute to SPICE, but I >>> think they are welcome to contribute regardless of if ISO is mentioned >>> directly by name. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ** Per the “In-Scope” >>> >>> >>> >>> -- Per the text “The SPICE WG will consider the use of TEEs (Trusted >>> Execution Environments) for managing key material and digital credentials.” >>> Can that design be made now? Can this be deferred for future charter >>> scope? I’m practically asking what “consider” means here. It seems like a >>> conditional scope (i.e., “we don’t know if we want to deliver this but we >>> want it in scope”). >>> >>> >>> I removed this, it's been a recurring point of contention. Some folks >>> feel that TEE is essential, others don't. I don't see the sentence adding >>> any value to the charter, and I do see it continuing to cause confusion. >>> >>> I did move some references to it to the "design considerations" of the >>> digital credentials section. >>> >>> >>> >>> -- Per the text “Focusing on crisp technical specifications and >>> producing separate informative guidance documents helps to keep technical >>> interested parties involved”, I observe that the planned deliverables only >>> include a single informative architecture. Is that sufficient? >>> >>> >>> I think so. >>> >>> >>> >>> Perhaps that is the lesson learned? >>> >>> >>> Much of the charter debate has reinforced this point. >>> >>> It is easy to talk about the "philosophical value" of digital >>> credentials, or even "desirable privacy properties", without discussing how >>> to build anything that can be implemented. >>> >>> I would say that this will remain the primary risk of the architecture >>> deliverable. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ** Per the Deliverables? >>> >>> >>> >>> -- Will the meta-discovery document describe a single protocol? multiple >>> protocols for discovery? Does it build on any prior work protocol work >>> (e.g., is it an HTTP API? COAP?) >>> >>> >>> Short answer is we don't know. >>> >>> It seems very likely that HTTP will be a component, but we don't want to >>> preclude other transports such as QR Codes, NFC, Bluetooth, etc... >>> >>> The point of this document is not to address all of these, but to >>> provide a concrete way to discover the optionality that exists in the wild >>> today. >>> >>> I added some related drafts that we have worked on trying to >>> characterize this challenge. >>> >>> >>> >>> -- Per a “document specifying the selective disclosure of claims in a >>> secure and privacy-friendly manner”: >>> >>> >>> >>> o What is the relation between this document and digital credential (the >>> substance of the front matter)? Is this providing a framework/set of >>> claims to let others produce their own digital credentials with particular >>> security properties? >>> >>> >>> Yes, I added some references, and extra text to try to make this clearer. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> o What is the relationship between the “security” and “privacy-friendly” >>> properties and the more detailed key design properties? >>> >>> >>> I think it's mostly just repeating the design properties, I think the >>> new text addresses this. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> o What is the encoding of the claims for this document? JSON and CBOR >>> are noted in the lesson learned but not in the explicit scoping. >>> >>> >>> At this point, we don't seem to be able to agree to pick just one, but >>> there does seem to be consensus to pull the useful digital credential parts >>> from each, and harmonize them. >>> >>> As an example, SCITT built "receipts" which SD-JWT does not support, >>> OAuth built SD-JWT which COSE does not support, so SCITT cannot use it. >>> >>> Both rely on the `iss` , `sub` and `cnf` claims, which are supported in >>> JOSE and COSE, and are essential to the "3 roles", issuer (AS), holder >>> (client) (of credentials, maker of presentations) and verifier (RP)... >>> >>> Another example would be how JWT supported claims in headers, but CWT >>> did not until recently, and when that feature was added, we learned that >>> kccs had already ported part of it... for those who want the details: >>> >>> - https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lake-edhoc/22/ >>> - >>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-cose-cwt-claims-in-headers/10/ >>> >>> in https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose/cose.xhtml#header-parameters >>> >>> The claims disclosure document, will address this kind of challenge, >>> when deploying credentials based on CWT and JWT, in a similar way to how >>> EAT attempted to address this in: >>> >>> >>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-eat-25#name-the-claims >>> >>> Hopefully these comments are helpful, if you like I can merge the PR or >>> I can leave it open and make adjustments in case you have further comments. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> OS >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Roman >>> >>> >>> >>> *From:* Orie Steele <orie@transmute.industries> >>> *Sent:* Thursday, January 18, 2024 1:19 PM >>> *To:* spice@ietf.org >>> *Subject:* [SPICE] Revised Charter >>> >>> >>> >>> Hello Spice Enthusiasts, >>> >>> Our revised draft charter can be found here: >>> >>> - >>> https://github.com/transmute-industries/ietf-spice-charter/blob/8f140a014ed13a21ff308b4d48d745ead67d8c54/charter.md >>> >>> Thanks to everyone who contributed text on github and through the >>> mailing list. >>> >>> As mentioned on our calls, I will submit a bof request with the draft >>> charter text as of today. >>> >>> If anyone has objections to the current charter text, please provide NEW >>> and OLD suggestions through the mailing list (on a seperate thread), so we >>> can finalize any remaining gaps. >>> >>> If you support the current draft charter text, please reply to this >>> email indicating that you support the current text. >>> >>> I support the current charter text. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> OS >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> *ORIE STEELE *Chief Technology Officer >>> www.transmute.industries >>> >>> [image: Image removed by sender.] <https://transmute.industries/> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> *ORIE STEELE *Chief Technology Officer >>> www.transmute.industries >>> >>> [image: Image removed by sender.] <https://transmute.industries/> >>> -- >>> SPICE mailing list >>> SPICE@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spice >>> >> -- ORIE STEELE Chief Technology Officer www.transmute.industries <https://transmute.industries>
- [SPICE] Revised Charter Orie Steele
- Re: [SPICE] Revised Charter Mahmoud Alkhraishi
- Re: [SPICE] Revised Charter Brent Zundel
- Re: [SPICE] Revised Charter Orie Steele
- Re: [SPICE] Revised Charter Michael Prorock
- Re: [SPICE] Revised Charter Manu Fontaine
- Re: [SPICE] Revised Charter Orie Steele
- Re: [SPICE] Revised Charter Manu Fontaine
- Re: [SPICE] Revised Charter Roman Danyliw
- Re: [SPICE] Revised Charter Orie Steele
- Re: [SPICE] Revised Charter Manu Fontaine
- Re: [SPICE] Revised Charter Denis
- Re: [SPICE] Revised Charter Orie Steele
- Re: [SPICE] Revised Charter Denis
- Re: [SPICE] Revised Charter Michael Prorock
- Re: [SPICE] Revised Charter Roman Danyliw
- Re: [SPICE] Revised Charter Brent Zundel
- Re: [SPICE] Revised Charter Michael Prorock
- Re: [SPICE] Revised Charter Orie Steele
- Re: [SPICE] Revised Charter Michael Prorock
- Re: [SPICE] Revised Charter Orie Steele
- Re: [SPICE] Revised Charter Denis
- Re: [SPICE] Revised Charter Denis