Re: [spring] A note on CRH and on going testing

Jeff Tantsura <jefftant.ietf@gmail.com> Fri, 20 September 2019 02:53 UTC

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From: Jeff Tantsura <jefftant.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2019 19:53:10 -0700
Cc: "Bernier, Daniel" <daniel.bernier@bell.ca>, SING Team <s.i.n.g.team.0810@gmail.com>, SPRING WG List <spring@ietf.org>
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To: "Chengli (Cheng Li)" <chengli13@huawei.com>
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Subject: Re: [spring] A note on CRH and on going testing
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There’s number of solutions on the market that extensively use BSID for multi-domain as well as multi-layer signaling.

Regards,
Jeff

> On Sep 19, 2019, at 19:49, Chengli (Cheng Li) <chengli13@huawei.com> wrote:
> 
> +1.
>  
> As I mentioned before, Binding SID is not only for shortening SID list.
> We should see the important part of binding SID in inter-domain routing,  since it hides the details of intra-domain. Security and Privacy are always important.
>  
> Since the EH insertion related text will be removed from SRv6 NP draft, I don’t think anyone will still say we don’t need binding SID.
> Let’s be honest, Encap mode Binding SID is very useful in inter-domain routing. It is not secure to share internal info outside a trusted network domain.
>  
> Cheng
>  
>  
> From: spring [mailto:spring-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Bernier, Daniel
> Sent: Thursday, September 19, 2019 11:36 PM
> To: SING Team <s.i.n.g.team.0810@gmail.com>
> Cc: 'SPRING WG List' <spring@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [spring] A note on CRH and on going testing
>  
> +1
>  
> This is what we did on our multi-cloud trials.
>  
> Encap with Binding SID to avoid inter-domain mapping + I don’t need to have some sort of inter-domain alignment of PSSIs
>  
> Dan
>  
> On 2019-09-19, 11:18 AM, "spring on behalf of SING Team" <spring-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of s.i.n.g.team.0810@gmail.com> wrote:
>  
> Hi Andrew,
> 
> Good to hear that reality experiment :)
> 
> But is it secure to share internal SID-IP mappings outside a trusted network domain?
> 
> Or is there an analogue like Binding SID of SRv6, in SRv6+?
> 
> Btw, PSSI and PPSI can not do that now, right?
> 
> Best regards,
> Moonlight Thoughts
> 
> 
> (mail failure, try to cc to spring again.)
> 
> On 09/19/2019 17:49, Andrew Alston wrote:
> Hi Guys, 
> 
> I thought this may be of interest in light of discussions around deployments and running code - because one of the things we've been testing is inter-domain traffic steering with CRH on both our DPDK implementation and another implementation. 
> 
> So - the setup we used last night: 
> 
> 6 systems in a lab - one of which linked to the open internet.  Call these S1 -> S6 
> 3 systems in a lab on the other side of the world - no peering between the networks in question.  Call these R1 -> R3 
> 
> We applied a SID list on S1, that steered S1 -> S2 -> S3 -> S6 -> R1 -> R3, with the relevant mappings from the CRH SID's to the underlying addressing (S2 had a mapping for the SID for S3, S3 had a mapping for the SID corresponding to S6, S6 had a mapping for the SID corresponding to R1 etc) 
> 
> Then we sent some packets - and the test was entirely successful.   
> 
> What this effectively means is that if two providers agree to share the SID mappings - it is possible to steer across one network, out over an open path, and across a remote network.  Obviously this relies on the fact that EH's aren't being dropped by intermediate providers, but this isn't something we're seeing. 
> 
> Combine this with the BGP signaling draft - and the SID's can then be signaled between the providers - work still going on with regards to this for testing purposes.  Just as a note - there would be no requirement to share the full SID mapping or topologies when doing this with BGP - the requirement would be only to share the relevant SID's necessary for the steering. 
> 
> I can say from our side - with various other providers - this is something that we see *immense* use case for - for a whole host of reasons. 
> 
> Thanks 
> 
> Andrew 
> 
> 
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