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Re: [stir] Questions on the draft-ietf-stir-passport-rcd-04 integrity mechanism

Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com> Sun, 08 September 2019 05:29 UTC

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From: Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com>
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Date: Sun, 08 Sep 2019 00:28:52 -0500
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Subject: Re: [stir] Questions on the draft-ietf-stir-passport-rcd-04 integrity mechanism
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Oops, I also left “rcd” out of the subject. Fixed.

> On Sep 7, 2019, at 11:50 AM, Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com> wrote:
> 
> Minor correction below:
> 
>> On Sep 6, 2019, at 4:31 PM, Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com> wrote:
>> 
>> Signed PGP part
>> Hi,
>> 
>> I have a couple of high level questions about the new integrity mechanism in draft-ietf-stir-passport-04. Apologies if these have already been discussed.
>> 
>> 1) Do I understand correctly that the certificate used to sign a PASSporT with an rcdi claim MUST include a constraint for the _value_ of the digest? That is, if someone makes any change to any of the information they would normally include in an rcd claim, the signing party must get a new cert?
>> 
>> My concern is that, for good or bad, commercial callers really like to control the customer experience. Many like to change things up all the time. I can imagine things like special date-specific logos (e.g. Google doodles), “sale” badges on logos, distinctive branding for different “campaigns”, etc.  I realize things like ACME make the process of getting a new cert lighter weight than it used to be, but is it reasonable to require a new cert for any change?
>> 
>> This might be worse for third-party signers who may sign on behalf of many callers, each of which keeps changing things.
>> 
>> 2) If I understand correctly, if anything in the rcd claim includes a URL, the rcdi claim incorporates the associated content. What about URLs?
> 
> Uhm, I meant to say additional URLs
> 
>> For example, lets say a jcl key links to a jCard, and that jCard has a LOGO element with a URI? Is the alleged logo content at that URI protected?
>> 
>> I assume the answer is that the answer is no; otherwise it could be URLs all the way down and we have to stop somewhere. This is probably a matter of signer or issuer) policy. If so, it might be worth having some operational guidance that they need to think about such things.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>

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