Re: [stir] Review of draft-ietf-stir-passport-09
Chris Wendt <chris-ietf@chriswendt.net> Sun, 30 October 2016 21:03 UTC
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From: Chris Wendt <chris-ietf@chriswendt.net>
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Date: Sun, 30 Oct 2016 17:03:53 -0400
In-Reply-To: <CABcZeBOH+L+AJC40s00tj5QLMOr4XHCkMckFh8tQ5Opsn5qtsQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Subject: Re: [stir] Review of draft-ietf-stir-passport-09
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Hi Eric, Thanks. Answers inline. -Chris > On Oct 29, 2016, at 7:32 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote: > > OVERALL > This document would be easier to read if it came with an example > at the beginning (perhaps the one in 9.1). > > I've also been thinking about the use of a URL here. This has > the result that it doesn't bind the certificate itself into the > digital signature, but only the URL. So this implies that it's > at least potentially possible to substitute one certificate > for another with the same private key. Is that a concern here? Other than stolen private key scenarios, which are a concern whether you use URL or not, I’m not sure of a reason why someone would want to do this for legitimate reasons and there would be any concern for multiple certificates being able to validate a call, or whether someone with legitimate access to the private key and would want to use this technique illegitimately would be a valid scenario unless they are a bad actor in the first place. > > > S 4.3. > Certificate chains are generally self-validating, so can you explain > why you need HTTPS here? Clearly, it's good practice for confidentiality > and to prevent other forms of attack, but still. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7515#section-4.1.5 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7515#section-4.1.5> does call for it. I could certainly remove the direct reference to this fact and leave it to the generic reference to RFC7515. It also technically calls for server identity validation using RFC6125 as well. > > > S 5.2. > { > "dest":{ > "tn":["12125551212"], > "uri":["sip:alice@example.com <mailto:sip%3Aalice@example.com>", > "sip:bob@example.net <mailto:sip%3Abob@example.net>"] > }, > "iat":"1443208345", > "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"} > } > > This indentation seems weird. Should you be outdenting the "uri" line. Simple format problem, fixed. > > S 5.2.2. > Given the ambiguity about multiple fingerprints, you should probably > cite the 4572-bis draft. Added. > > > S 7. > The using protocol of the compact form of PASSporT MUST > > This "using protocol" language is pretty odd. Maybe define a specific > term somewhere else? "application protocol"? > The “using protocol” was a suggestion from JP, so i’ll let him answer that. > S 9. > JSON, as a canonical format, can include spaces and line breaks, and > key value pairs can occur in any order. > > Doesn't this mean that JSON isn't canonical? good point :) fixed. > > > S A.1, A.2 > > These aren't actually X.509 structure. Also, the private key in S 8.1 > is in an OpenSSL-specific structure. Could you encode it in PKCS#8. Ok so I’ll do this: openssl pkcs8 -topk8 -nocrypt -in key.pem -out p8file.pem -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgi7q2TZvN9VDFg8Vy qCP06bETrR2v8MRvr89rn4i+UAahRANCAAQWfaj1HUETpoNCrOtp9KA8o0V79IuW ARKt9C1cFPkyd3FBP4SeiNZxQhDrD0tdBHls3/wFe8++K2FrPyQF9vuh -----END PRIVATE KEY—— Correct? > > _______________________________________________ > stir mailing list > stir@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/stir
- [stir] Review of draft-ietf-stir-passport-09 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [stir] Review of draft-ietf-stir-passport-09 Chris Wendt
- Re: [stir] Review of draft-ietf-stir-passport-09 Eric Rescorla