Re: [stir] AD Review: draft-ietf-stir-rph-02

Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com> Mon, 22 January 2018 16:31 UTC

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To: Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>
Cc: STIR Chairs <stir-chairs@ietf.org>, "stir@ietf.org" <stir@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-stir-rph.all@tools.ietf.org" <draft-ietf-stir-rph.all@tools.ietf.org>
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From: Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com>
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Subject: Re: [stir] AD Review: draft-ietf-stir-rph-02
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The -divert- document needs to co-exist with "ppt" extensions in 
general, and I would be very sad if its design required additional 
considerations in each such extension. What kind of impact are you 
envisioning?

/a

On 1/20/18 5:34 PM, Christer Holmberg wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Do the nesting discussions affect this extension? I assume one could 
> use this with other passports.
>
> Regards,
>
> Christer
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> On 20 Jan 2018, at 0.15, Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com 
> <mailto:adam@nostrum.com>> wrote:
>
>> I'm doing my AD review of draft-ietf-stir-rph-02. Thanks to everyone 
>> who has worked on this document, and the authors and chairs in 
>> particular.
>>
>> The technical content here looks generally good to me. I'd like to 
>> see a few issues addressed before IETF LC. In short sumary:
>>
>>   * The validation section needs to add a discussion of how to treat
>>     calls when the priority values in "rph" passports and SIP
>>     "Resource-Priority" header fields aren't 100% identical.
>>   * The examples need some adjustment.
>>   * There is a minor point of ambiguity in the Security Section, but
>>     this should be easy to fix, as long as the WG knows what was
>>     intended.
>>   * The IANA actions need a little bit of adjustment.
>>   * There are a number of minor editorial issues to be cleaned up.
>>
>> Detailed comments on these points are inline in the document below. 
>> I've removed some portions of the document on which I have no comments.
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Abstract
>>>
>>>    This document extends the STIR PASSporT specification to allow the
>>
>>
>> "...the Secure Telephone Identity Revisited (STIR) Personal Assertion 
>> Token (PASSporT) specification defined in RFC 8122..."
>>
>> (See <https://www.rfc-editor.org/materials/abbrev.expansion.txt> for 
>> guidance on abbreviations)
>>
>>
>>>    inclusion of cryptographically-signed assertions of authorization for
>>>    the values populated in the SIP 'Resource-Priority' header field,
>>>    which is used for communications resource prioritization.
>>>
>>> ...
>>>
>>> 1.  Introduction
>>>
>>>    PASSporT [I-D.ietf-stir-passport] is a token format based on JWT
>>>    [RFC7519] for conveying cryptographically-signed information about
>>>    the identities involved in personal communications; it is used with
>>>    STIR [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] to convey a signed assertion of the
>>>    identity of the participants in real-time communications established
>>>    via a protocol like SIP.  This specification extends PASSporT to
>>
>>
>> "...like SIP [RFC3261]..."
>>
>> (We want to cite SIP the first time it is mentioned)
>>
>>
>>>    allow cryptographic-signing of the SIP 'Resource-Priority' header
>>>    field defined in [RFC4412].
>>>
>>>    [RFC4412] defines the SIP 'Resource-Priority' header field for
>>>    communications Resource Priority.  As specified in [RFC4412], the
>>>    'Resource-Priority' header field may be used by SIP user agents
>>>    [RFC3261], including, Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN)
>>
>>
>> "...including Public Switched..."
>>
>> (remove the comma)
>>
>>
>>>    gateways and terminals, and SIP proxy servers to influence
>>
>>
>> "...and by SIP proxy servers, to influence..."
>>
>> (add "by" and comma)
>>
>>
>>>    prioritization afforded to communication sessions,including PSTN
>>
>> "...sessions, including..."
>>
>> (space after comma)
>>
>>
>>>    calls.  However, the SIP 'Resource-Priority' header field could be
>>>    spoofed and abused by unauthorized entities.
>>>
>>>    The STIR architecture [RFC7340]assumes that an authority on the
>>
>>
>> "...STIR architecture [RFC7340] assumes..."
>>
>> (space before "assumes")
>>
>>
>>>    originating side of a call provides a cryptographic assurance of the
>>>    validity of the calling party number in order to prevent
>>>    impersonation attacks.  The STIR architecture allows extension that
>>
>>
>> "...allows extensions..."
>>
>>
>>>    can be utilized by authorities supporting real-time communication
>>>    services using the 'Resource-Priority' header field to
>>>    cryptographically sign the SIP 'Resource-Priority' header field and
>>>    convey assertion of the authorization for 'Resource-Priority'.  For
>>>    example, the authority on the originating side verifying the
>>>    authorization of a particular communication for Resource-Priority can
>>
>>
>> Single quotes around 'Resource-Priority'.
>>
>>
>>>    use a PASSPorT claim to cryptographically-sign the SIP 'Resource-
>>
>>
>> "...cryptographically sign..."
>>
>>
>>>    Priority' header field and convey an assertion of the authorization
>>>    for 'Resource-Priority'.  This will allow a receiving entity
>>>    (including entities located in different network domains/boundaries)
>>>    to verify the validity of assertions authorizing Resource-Priority.
>>
>>
>> Single quotes around 'Resource-Priority'.
>>
>>
>>>    Cryptographically-signed SIP 'Resource-Priority' headers will allow a
>>
>>
>> "...cryptographically signed SIP 'Resource-Priority' header fields..."
>>
>> (remove hyphen, and replace "headers" with "header fields")
>>
>>
>>>    receiving entity to verify and act on the information with confidence
>>>    that the information have not been spoofed or compromised.
>>
>>
>> "...has not been spoofed or compromised."
>>
>>
>>>
>>>    This specification documents an optional extension to PASSporT and
>>>    the associated STIR mechanisms to provide a function to sign the SIP
>>>    'Resource-Priority' header field.  This PASSporT object is used to
>>>    provide attestation of a calling user authorization for priority
>>>    communications.  This is necessary in addition to the PASSporT object
>>>    that is used for calling user telephone number attestation.  How the
>>>    optional extension to PASSporT is used for real-time communications
>>>    supported using SIP 'Resource-Priority' header field is defined in
>>>    other documents and is outside the scope of this document.
>>
>>
>> I assume these other documents are under development? If so, they 
>> should be cited here.
>>
>>
>>>
>>> 2.  Terminology
>>>
>>>    The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
>>>    "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
>>>    document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
>>
>>
>> This document has several non-normative uses of "must", "should," and 
>> "may," and so it needs to use the RFC8174 boilerplate instead of the 
>> RFC2119 boilerplate.
>>
>>
>>>
>>> 3.  PASSporT 'rph' Claim
>>>
>>>    This specification defines a new JSON Web Token claim for "rph",
>>>    which provides an assertion for information in SIP 'Resource-
>>>    Priority'header.
>>
>>
>> "...Priority' header field."
>>
>> (space after closing quotation mark, "header field" instead of "header")
>>
>>
>>>
>>>    The creator of a PASSporT object adds a "ppt" value of "rph" to the
>>>    header of a PASSporT object, in which case the PASSporT claims MUST
>>>    contain a "rph" claim, and any entities verifying the PASSporT object
>>>    will be required to understand the "ppt" extension in order to
>>>    process the PASSporT in question.  A PASSPorT header with the "ppt"
>>>    included will look as follows:
>>>
>>>    {  "typ":"passport",
>>>      "ppt":"rph",
>>>      "alg":"ES256",
>>>      "x5u":"https://www.example.org/cert.cer"}
>>
>>
>> Ideally, this would be either pretty-printed or canonicalized. Since 
>> it's too long to fit on a line in canonical form, I propose:
>>
>> {
>>   "typ":"passport",
>>   "ppt":"rph",
>>   "alg":"ES256",
>>   "x5u":"https://www.example.org/cert.cer"
>> }
>>
>>
>>>
>>>    The "rph" claim will provide an assertion of authorization,"auth",
>>
>>
>> "...authorization, "auth", ..."
>>
>> (space between comma and opening quotation mark)
>>
>>
>>>    for information in the SIP "Resource-Priority" header field (i.e.,
>>>    Resource-Priority: namespace "." r-priority) based on [RFC4412].
>>
>>
>> The use of the string 'namespace "." r-priority' here and elsewhere 
>> in the document has a detrimental impact on readability. I strongly 
>> suggest replacing it with "r-value" (the name of this production in 
>> RFC4412) everywhere.
>>
>>
>>>    Specifically, the "rph" claim includes assertion of the priority-
>>>    level of the user to be used for a given communication session.  The
>>>    value of the "rph" claim is an array containing one or more of JSON
>>>    objects for the content of the SIP 'Resource-Priority' header that is
>>>    being asserted of which one of the "rph" object, is mandatory.
>>
>>
>> This last sentence is very hard to parse; and (based on the example) 
>> the value is intended to be a JSON Object (curly braces) rather than 
>> a JSON Array (square braces). I suggest: 'The value of the "rph" 
>> claim is an Object with one or more keys. Each key is associated with 
>> a JSON Array. These arrays contain Strings that correspond to the 
>> r-values indicated in the SIP "Resource-Priority" header field.' 
>> (note: "header field", not "header")
>>
>>
>>>
>>>    The following is an example "rph" claim for a SIP "Resource-Priority"
>>>    header field with a "namespace "." r-priority" value of "ets.0" and
>>>    with a "namespace "." r-priority" value of "wps.0".
>>>
>>>     { "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
>>>      "dest":{["tn":"12125551213"]},
>>>      "iat":1443208345,
>>>      "rph":{"auth":["ets.0","wps.0"]}
>>
>>
>> As above, I recommend pretty-printing this. It's also missing a comma 
>> after the "orig" value, and the top-level structure is missing a 
>> closing brace. The value for "iat" needs to be enclosed in quotes.
>>
>> The NANPA has allocated NPA55501xx for example use, not NPA555xxxx, 
>> much of which remains assignable (cf 
>> <https://www.nationalnanpa.com/pdf/NRUF/ATIS-0300115.pdf>).
>>
>> Putting all this together, I believe what you want is:
>>
>> {
>>   "orig":{"tn":"12155550112"},
>>   "dest":{["tn":"12125550113"]},
>>   "iat":"1443208345",
>>   "rph":{"auth":["ets.0","wps.0"]}
>> }
>>
>>
>>>
>>>    After the header and claims PASSporT objects have been constructed,
>>>    their signature is generated normally per the guidance in
>>>    [I-D.ietf-stir-passport] using the full form of PASSPorT.  The
>>>    credentials (e.g., authority responsible for authorizing Resource-
>>>    Priority) used to create the signature must have authority over the
>>>    "rph" claim and there is only one authority per claim.  The authority
>>>    MUST use its credentials (i.e., CERT) associated with the specific
>>>    service supported by the SIP namespace in the claim.
>>>
>>> 4.  'rph' in SIP
>>>
>>>    This section specifies SIP-specific usage for the "rph" claim in
>>>    PASSporT.
>>>
>>> 4.1.  Authentication Service Behavior
>>>
>>>    The Authentication Service will create the "rph" claim using the
>>>    values discussed in section 3 based on [RFC4412].  The construction
>>>    of "rph" claim follows the steps described in Section 4 of
>>>    [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis].
>>>
>>>    The resulting Identity header for "rph" might look as follows:
>>
>>
>> "...header field..."
>>
>>
>>>
>>> "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJleUowZVhBaU9pSnd
>>> ZWE56Y0c5eWRDSXNEUW9pY0hCMElqb2ljbkJvSWl3TkNpSmhiR2NpT2lKRlV6STFO
>>> aUlzRFFvaWVEVjFJanBvZEhSd2N6b3ZMM2QzZHk1bGVHRnRjR3hsTG1OdmJTOWpaW
>>> EowTG1ObGNuME5DZzBLIHx84oCZLuKAmXx8IGV5QWliM0pwWnlJNmV5SjBiaUk2SW
>>> pFeU1UVTFOVFV4TWpFeUluME5DaUprWlhOMElqcDdXeUowYmlJNklqRXlNVEkxTlR
>>> VeE1qRXpJbDE5TEEwS0ltbGhkQ0k2TVRRME16SXdPRE0wTlN3TkNpSnljR2dpT25z
>>> aVlYVjBhQ0k2V3lKbGRITXVNQ0lzSW5kd2N5NHdJbDE5RFFvPSJ9.s37S6VC8HM6D
>>> l6YzJeQDsrZcwJ0lizxhUrA7f_98oWBHvo-cl-n8MIhoCr18vYYFy3blXvs3fslM_
>>>    oos2P2Dyw"; info= "https://www.example.org/cert.cer";alg=ES256;
>>>    ppt="rph"
>>
>>
>> This example has a number of issues:
>>
>>   * In the Identity header field, the signed-identity-digest
>>     shouldn't be quoted.
>>   * In the Identity header field, info is enclosed in <> rather than "".
>>   * In the Identity header field, ppt is a token rather than a quoted
>>     string.
>>   * The signed-identity-digest header needs to indicate a "typ" of
>>     "passport" rather than JWT, and it needs to include both a "ppt"
>>     and "x5u" field.
>>   * The signed-identity-digest body should contain only the passport
>>     claim rather than a JSON object that itself contains a
>>     base64-encoded JWS header concatenated with a claim.
>>   * I believe that, even when the body is included, values in the
>>     header and body need to be be canonicalized (i.e., all on one
>>     line, no spaces, in alphabetical order, etc.)
>>
>> I would also recommend following the convention of indicating that 
>> line-wraps are only for readability, and including the header field 
>> name in the example. Putting all this together, I believe what you 
>> want is:
>>
>>    For example, a Identity header field for "rph" might look
>>    as follows (backslashes shown for line folding only):
>>
>>    Identity: eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInBwdCI6InJwaCIsInR5cCI6InBhc3Nwb3J0I \
>> iwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vY2VydC5jZXIifQo.eyJkZXN0 \
>> Ijp7WyJ0biI6IjEyMTI1NTUwMTEzIl19LCJpYXQiOiIxNDQzMjA4MzQ1Iiwib3JpZyI \
>> 6eyJ0biI6IjEyMTU1NTUwMTEyIn0sInJwaCI6eyJhdXRoIjpbImV0cy4wIiwid3BzLj \
>> AiXX19Cg.s37S6VC8HM6Dl6YzJeQDsrZcwJ0lizxhUrA7f_98oWBHvo-cl-n8MIhoCr \
>>    18vYYFy3blXvs3fslM_oos2P2Dyw;info=<https://www.example.org/cert.cer \
>>    >;alg=ES256;ppt=rph
>>
>> (Note: this example assumes the calling and called party numbers in 
>> the previous example are changed to 12155550112 and 12155550113, 
>> respectively)
>>
>>
>>>
>>>    A SIP authentication service typically will derive the value of "rph"
>>>    from the 'Resource-Priority' header field based on policy associated
>>>    with service specific use of the "namespace "." r-priority" values
>>>    based on [RFC4412].  The authentication service derives the value of
>>>    the PASSPorT claim by verifying the authorization for Resource-
>>>    Priority (i.e., verifying a calling user privilege for Resource-
>>>    Priority based on its identity) which might be derived from customer
>>>    profile data or from access to external services.
>>>
>>>    [RFC4412] allows multiple "namespace "." r-priority" pairs, either in
>>>    a single SIP Resource-Priority header or across multiple SIP
>>
>>
>> Single quotes around 'Resource-Priority'.
>>
>> "...header field..."
>>
>>
>>>    Resource-Priority headers. However, it is not necessary to sign all
>>
>>
>> Single quotes around 'Resource-Priority'.
>>
>> "...header fields..."
>>
>>
>>>    content of a SIP Resource-Priority header or all SIP Resource-
>>
>>
>> Single quotes around 'Resource-Priority'.
>>
>> "...header field..."
>>
>>
>>>    Priority headers in a given SIP message.  An authority is only
>>
>>
>> Single quotes around 'Resource-Priority'.
>>
>> "...header fields..."
>>
>>
>>>    responsible for signing the content of a SIP Resource-Priority header
>>
>>
>> Single quotes around 'Resource-Priority'.
>>
>> "...header field..."
>>
>>
>>>    for which it has authority (e.g., a specific "namespace "."
>>>    r-priority").
>>>
>>> 4.2.  Verification Service Behavior
>>>
>>>    [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] Section 6.2 Step 5 requires that
>>>    specifications defining "ppt" values describe any additional verifier
>>>    behavior.  The behavior specified for the "ppt" values of "rph" is as
>>>    follows:
>>>
>>>    The verification service MUST extract the value associated with the
>>>    "auth" key in a full form PASSPorT with a "ppt" value of "rph".  If
>>>    the signature validates, then the verification service can use the
>>>    value of the "rph" claim as validation that the calling party is
>>>    authorized for Resource-Priority, which would in turn be used for
>>
>> Single quotes around 'Resource-Priority'.
>>
>> This text is ambiguous about whether the validation indicates that 
>> the calling party is authorized to use the priorities indicated in 
>> the passport object, or the values in the SIP 'Resource-Priority' 
>> header field; and (taken on its face) implies the latter, when the 
>> intention here should clearly be the former.
>>
>> "...authorized for 'Resource-Priority' indicated in the claim. This 
>> value would in turn be used for..."
>>
>> The text also needs to say something about comparing values in the 
>> claim to values in the 'Resource-Priority' header field, and what a 
>> mismatch might mean. The document says elsewhere that the signature 
>> might only cover some of the r-values, which makes it entirely 
>> possible that the 'Resource-Priority' field might contain more values 
>> than are signed. On the other hand, intermediaries might reasonably 
>> remove r-values as the call is processed. This probably means that 
>> those removed priorities should not be used, even if they are present 
>> in the passport. It seems reasonable to say that *typical* processing 
>> by a receiving party would be to take the *union* of all RPH 
>> passports that they trust, and *intersect* that with the priorities 
>> in 'Resource-Priority' header fields to get the actual priority or 
>> priorities to be applied to the call (subject to local policy).
>>
>>
>>>    priority treatment in accordance with local policy for the associated
>>>    communication service.
>>>
>>>    In addition, [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] Section 6.2 Step 4 requires
>>>    "iat" value in "rph" claim to be verified.
>>>
>>>    The behavior of a SIP UAs upon receiving an INVITE containing a
>>
>>
>> "...of a SIP UA upon..."
>>
>> or
>>
>> "...of SIP UAs upon..."
>>
>>
>>>    PASSporT object with a "rph" claim will largely remain a matter of
>>>    implementation policy for the specific communication service.  In
>>>    most cases,implementations would act based on confidence in the
>>
>>
>> "...cases, implementations..."
>>
>> (space after comma)
>>
>>
>>>    veracity of this information.  The use of the compact form of
>>
>>
>> Paragraph break before "The".
>>
>>
>>>    PASSporT is not specified in this document.
>>>
>>> 5.  Further Information Associated with Resource-Priority
>>
>>
>> Single quotes around 'Resource-Priority'.
>>
>>
>>>
>>>    There may be additional information about the calling party or the
>>>    call that could be relevant to authorization for Resource-Priority.
>>
>>
>> Single quotes around 'Resource-Priority'.
>>
>>
>>>    This may include information related to the device subscription of
>>>    the caller, or to any institutions that the caller or device is
>>>    associated with, or even categories of institutions.  All of these
>>>    data elements would benefit from the secure attestations provided by
>>>    the STIR and PASSporT frameworks.  The specification of the "rph"
>>>    claim could entail the optional presence of one or more such
>>>    additional information fields.
>>>
>>>    A new IANA registry has been defined to hold potential values of the
>>>    "rph" array; see Section 6.2.  The definition of the "rph" claim may
>>>    have one or more such additional information field(s).  Details of
>>>    such "rph" claim to encompass other data elements are left for future
>>>    version of this specification.
>>>
>>> 6.  IANA Considerations
>>>
>>> 6.1.  JSON Web Token Claims Registration
>>
>>
>> I think there's some confusion here. You're registering a PASSporT 
>> ppt value, not a new JWT claim. That is to say, you're adding an 
>> entry to this table:
>>
>> https://www.iana.org/assignments/passport/passport.xhtml
>>
>> Not to this table:
>>
>> https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt/jwt.xhtml
>>
>> You would only use the second table if you had a new key to add to 
>> the PASSporT header -- this specification does not do that.
>>
>> This section also needs some introductory text to let the IANA know 
>> exactly what to do; e.g. "This document registers a new value for the 
>> "Personal Assertion Token (PASSporT) Extensions" table.
>>
>>>
>>>    o  ppt value: "rph"
>>>
>>>    o  Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [RFCThis]
>>>
>>> 6.2.  PASSporT 'rph' Types
>>>
>>>    This document requests that the IANA add a new entry to the PASSporT
>>>    Types registry for the type "rph" which is specified in [RFCThis].
>>
>>
>> There isn't an IANA table called "PASSporT Types." I presume this is 
>> the registration we just discussed in section 6.1, and so the above 
>> two lines can be removed.
>>
>>
>>>    This specification also requests that the IANA create a new registry
>>>    for PASSporT "rph" types.  Registration of new PASSporT "rph" types
>>>    shall be under the specification required policy.  This registry is
>>>    to be initially populated with a single value for "auth" which is
>>>    specified in [RFCThis].
>>
>>
>> This needs to be very clear about the fields to be included in this 
>> new registry (e.g., "Registry entries must contain two fields: the 
>> name of the 'rph' type and the specification in which the type is 
>> described").
>>
>>
>>>
>>> 7.  Security Considerations
>>>
>>>    The security considerations discussed in [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis]
>>>    in Section 10 are applicable here.
>>>
>>> 7.1.  Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks
>>>
>>>    The PASSporT extension with a "ppt" value of "rph" MUST only be sent
>>>    with SIP INVITE when 'Resource-Priority' header is used to convey the
>>
>>
>> "...header field..."
>>
>>
>>>    priority of the communication as defined in [RFC4412].  To avoid the
>>>    replay, and cut and paste attacks, the procedures described in
>>>    Section 10.1 of [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] MUST be followed.
>>>
>>> 7.2.  Solution Considerations
>>>
>>>    The use of extension to PASSporT tokens with "ppt" value "rph" based
>>>    on the validation of the digital signature and the associated
>>>    certificate requires consideration of the authentication and
>>>    authority or reputation of the signer to attest to the identity being
>>>    asserted.  The following considerations should be recognized when
>>>    using PASSporT extension with "ppt" value of "rph":
>>>
>>>    o  An authority (signer) is only allowed to sign the content of a SIP
>>>       'Resource-Priority' header for which it has the right authority.
>>
>>
>> "...header field..."
>>
>>
>>>       The authority that signs the token MUST have a secure method for
>>>       authentication of the end user or the device.
>>>
>>>    o  The verification of the signature MUST include means of verifying
>>>       that the signer is authoritative for the signed content of the SIP
>>
>>
>> It's not clear what authority is being claimed here. Is this supposed 
>> to mean something like "...verifying that the signer is authoritative 
>> for the originating tn in the PASSporT..."? Or "...authoritative for 
>> the resource priority namespace in the PASSporT?" Whatever the server 
>> is purportedly authoritative for needs to be clearly spelled out.
>>
>>
>>>       'Resource-Priority' header.
>>
>>
>> "...header field."
>>
>>
>> /a
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