[stir] RFC8224 / Use of a=fingerprint

"Asveren, Tolga" <tasveren@rbbn.com> Thu, 22 March 2018 12:14 UTC

Return-Path: <tasveren@rbbn.com>
X-Original-To: stir@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: stir@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 644DF127873 for <stir@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 22 Mar 2018 05:14:39 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.491
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.491 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_DKIM_INVALID=0.01] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=fail (1024-bit key) reason="fail (message has been altered)" header.d=sonusnetworks.onmicrosoft.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id sIKqjwBDiIIl for <stir@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 22 Mar 2018 05:14:36 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from us-smtp-delivery-181.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-181.mimecast.com [216.205.24.181]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C18981242F7 for <stir@ietf.org>; Thu, 22 Mar 2018 05:14:35 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=SonusNetworks.onmicrosoft.com; s=selector1-rbbn-com; h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version; bh=mpIeoMt6dmoj8wkvCHpMV1NSxtUUQXL5xMIMvrrOlFs=; b=PiUxhbzM9uY6tMOedK7PXr8UjHDpcOnKfCDHo8GH09GVJsWXkahCU96W6vTyB0YonGydX5YZV9AQSzELvBtza3wjMjj/lJW4zefH8ybiFuD1Aax2CBfz10ZQfs5YQufiAwbAS0PGBITjv4iDaGvtOv4z88EriHXDB9kDI9Ru6OM=
Received: from NAM02-BL2-obe.outbound.protection.outlook.com (mail-bl2nam02lp0083.outbound.protection.outlook.com [207.46.163.83]) (Using TLS) by us-smtp-1.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-179-NeCHxs63OKeG6WZ31SA-4Q-1; Thu, 22 Mar 2018 08:14:33 -0400
Received: from CY4PR03MB3160.namprd03.prod.outlook.com (10.171.245.165) by CY4PR03MB3094.namprd03.prod.outlook.com (10.171.245.147) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384_P256) id 15.20.588.14; Thu, 22 Mar 2018 12:14:31 +0000
Received: from CY4PR03MB3160.namprd03.prod.outlook.com ([fe80::34a3:3001:f444:3072]) by CY4PR03MB3160.namprd03.prod.outlook.com ([fe80::34a3:3001:f444:3072%13]) with mapi id 15.20.0588.017; Thu, 22 Mar 2018 12:14:31 +0000
From: "Asveren, Tolga" <tasveren@rbbn.com>
To: "stir@ietf.org" <stir@ietf.org>, "jon.peterson@neustar.biz" <jon.peterson@neustar.biz>
Thread-Topic: RFC8224 / Use of a=fingerprint
Thread-Index: AdPB1mxgabmHnDCQRziVwwwAjrynyw==
Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2018 12:14:31 +0000
Message-ID: <CY4PR03MB31607CC7753000B808381EECA5A90@CY4PR03MB3160.namprd03.prod.outlook.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach:
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
x-originating-ip: [73.29.251.142]
x-ms-publictraffictype: Email
x-microsoft-exchange-diagnostics: 1; CY4PR03MB3094; 7:llHMwV0BTExHfsquvQ2Mr85uP6D9bU7qS7WdPWLZhoi/97PRMVK/lqeMa+tf1NsEIs98+AnTvmZVpQVd3Ew6f5Pg4Dsni7xcnU3HFPxWerPSdf3lKTh5ifT0C/c4/MIm/1MGqIcX+eLAgMsxo258Z/avUHzHNUHR5hy/FxvSPvAAbNsL5TE4FF/vENQc4+jKJhUZzlaZSd2X1/w7azrtn7XFHo/wnhWt6d22N4rwSJPTPkoqO8PVDMHluAXQAQlo; 20:8nCvwbuVmveGBHufhsJJozLzqLkNk7E/KldJXRjhk7q69oevOHlqpeyO15B//4cafvzBtDb4ZInMBrnaVgMe9lclYUkBlag5iLlSbBEivryKGxQ78yqPrPqIseGo7orbjta7cOMtC95H0zpizHgS1Q1Xz6P5WBv9FXE8Jgkb6uw=
x-ms-office365-filtering-correlation-id: d540d36f-1195-4c3e-0082-08d58fee77b4
x-microsoft-antispam: UriScan:; BCL:0; PCL:0; RULEID:(7020095)(4652020)(5600026)(4604075)(3008032)(4534165)(4627221)(201703031133081)(201702281549075)(2017052603328)(7153060)(7193020); SRVR:CY4PR03MB3094;
x-ms-traffictypediagnostic: CY4PR03MB3094:
x-microsoft-antispam-prvs: <CY4PR03MB3094B04C122CBCFE6F5911CFA5A90@CY4PR03MB3094.namprd03.prod.outlook.com>
x-exchange-antispam-report-test: UriScan:;
x-exchange-antispam-report-cfa-test: BCL:0; PCL:0; RULEID:(8211001083)(6040522)(2401047)(5005006)(8121501046)(10201501046)(3231221)(944501327)(52105095)(93006095)(93001095)(3002001)(6041310)(20161123562045)(201703131423095)(201702281528075)(20161123555045)(201703061421075)(201703061406153)(20161123560045)(20161123558120)(20161123564045)(6072148)(201708071742011); SRVR:CY4PR03MB3094; BCL:0; PCL:0; RULEID:; SRVR:CY4PR03MB3094;
x-forefront-prvs: 0619D53754
x-forefront-antispam-report: SFV:NSPM; SFS:(10009020)(979002)(366004)(39860400002)(396003)(346002)(376002)(39380400002)(199004)(189003)(6506007)(99286004)(478600001)(59450400001)(6436002)(186003)(14454004)(5250100002)(102836004)(33656002)(2501003)(7696005)(53936002)(74316002)(26005)(25786009)(105586002)(97736004)(3660700001)(2906002)(81166006)(81156014)(8936002)(305945005)(55016002)(5660300001)(9686003)(8676002)(7736002)(3280700002)(6116002)(106356001)(316002)(68736007)(2900100001)(86362001)(110136005)(3846002)(66066001)(969003)(989001)(999001)(1009001)(1019001); DIR:OUT; SFP:1101; SCL:1; SRVR:CY4PR03MB3094; H:CY4PR03MB3160.namprd03.prod.outlook.com; FPR:; SPF:None; PTR:InfoNoRecords; A:1; MX:1; LANG:en;
x-microsoft-antispam-message-info: LJqQ1AUrLW6VQPcirieXuyf+7q1EzTwp0n6Z1d7M3mj84IN5A6i5aNc7xfuIeSl7oSfHMf4Pn9XfIMH6QKCKRjF64HdGe1HUEXN+2NbsG+fw/vMGZOJEB4ziguYL6X/GtwMfLERhsqhOeuCtLMKcopfXBgMENU9tLYy+cUUh9YjSJlG4Ti091M1j3NTi2Uy60rpQsyCDvEo6UDvgI2YKx0TNdZllMyRStFp7hySFkXkRhYjfiwQztyPd6fdv2ULMg7vUqlLdbkvtQyGZMDjNDZ7UwXI3OSiOwCK6jYR495JUyATfHEy6kuRjnjAIJF79+93AERZAwVcpD8pLjLB8xQ==
spamdiagnosticoutput: 1:99
spamdiagnosticmetadata: NSPM
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-OriginatorOrg: rbbn.com
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: d540d36f-1195-4c3e-0082-08d58fee77b4
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-originalarrivaltime: 22 Mar 2018 12:14:31.5754 (UTC)
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-fromentityheader: Hosted
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-id: 29a671dc-ed7e-4a54-b1e5-8da1eb495dc3
X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: CY4PR03MB3094
X-MC-Unique: NeCHxs63OKeG6WZ31SA-4Q-1
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="WINDOWS-1252"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/stir/lahVLqbKNJvVnUfRDv9ZLxymn9U>
Subject: [stir] RFC8224 / Use of a=fingerprint
X-BeenThere: stir@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22
Precedence: list
List-Id: Secure Telephone Identity Revisited <stir.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/stir>, <mailto:stir-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/stir/>
List-Post: <mailto:stir@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:stir-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/stir>, <mailto:stir-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2018 12:14:39 -0000

A few doubts regarding use of a=fingerprint for RFC8224:

4.1.  PASSporT Construction
...

   o  Fourth, if the request contains a Session Description Protocol
      (SDP) message body and if that SDP contains one or more
      "a=fingerprint" attributes, then the JSON key "mky" MUST appear
      with the algorithm(s) and value(s) of the fingerprint attributes
      (if they differ), following the format given in [RFC8225],
      Section 5.2.2.


12.1.  Protected Request Fields
...
  When signing a request that contains a fingerprint of keying material
   in SDP for DTLS-SRTP [RFC5763], this mechanism always provides a
   signature over that fingerprint.  This signature prevents certain
   classes of impersonation attacks in which an attacker forwards or
   cut-and-pastes a legitimate request.  Although the target of the
   attack may accept the request, the attacker will be unable to
   exchange media with the target, as they will not possess a key
   corresponding to the fingerprint.  For example, there are some
   baiting attacks, launched with the REFER method or through social
   engineering, where the attacker receives a request from the target
   and reoriginates it to a third party.  These might not be prevented
   by only a signature over the From, To, and Date, but they could be
   prevented by securing a fingerprint for DTLS-SRTP.  While this is a
   different form of impersonation than is commonly used for
   robocalling, ultimately there is little purpose in establishing the
   identity of the user that originated a SIP request if this assurance
   is not coupled with a comparable assurance over the contents of the
   subsequent media communication.  This signature also reduces the
   potential for active eavesdropping attacks against the SIP media.  In
   environments where DTLS-SRTP is unsupported, however, no field is
   signed and no protections are provided.

i- (with lawyer hat on)
Which one of these statements prevails? I assume it is the former as it is using normative language as "MUST" therefore "a=fingerprint" must be used when it is present.

ii- (with technical hat on)
Wouldn't the attack vector mentioned in 12.1 be applicable for connection oriented media, e.g. a=fingerprint in SDP is used while establishing a MSRP session (and possibly for other cases) as well?

Thanks,
Tolga