Re: [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions
Joe Touch <touch@isi.edu> Thu, 19 June 2014 18:35 UTC
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Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2014 11:35:06 -0700
From: Joe Touch <touch@isi.edu>
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Subject: Re: [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions
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On 6/19/2014 11:23 AM, ianG wrote: > On 19/06/2014 18:55 pm, Joe Touch wrote: ... > When did TCP have this 'urgent decision' ? If it happened several years > after 1996, then what you have is a forewarning that was ignored. If it > was after 2004, well, no amount of warning will do, and algorithmic > agility is a crutch that should be stripped away in order to focus > attention. 2004 was the first practical attack on MD5; the first draft of TCP-AO was 2007. It took another three years for the IETF sausage mill to generate a final result. Given that TCP-AO was used mostly for router security, and nobody had reported a successful MD5-based attack in the wild, that's not bad IMO. The primary problem with TCP MD5 was that it wasn't algorithm-agile. ... >> That's why TCP-AO included two 'must implement' algorithms from the >> start, and why it's important to do so here as well. > > I'd like to see some historical evidence of when this actually made a > difference? Yes, we understand the idea. But we now have 20 years of > experience in Internet protocols. We have data. What does the data say > about algorithmic agility, in the field? You're arguing two points at the same time. 1) use one algorithm I've already pointed out how that's dangerous; it prevents pre-deploying a backup when a given algorithm is deprecated. 2) don't have algorithm agility This is counter to your earlier post. If you consider that any one algorithm won't last forever, then ultimately we'll want a solution that can support different algorithms. I don't like either of the above, but they're separate points. Joe
- [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions Sandy Harris
- Re: [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions Tony Arcieri
- Re: [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions Joe Touch
- Re: [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions Joe Touch
- Re: [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions marcelo bagnulo braun
- Re: [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions marcelo bagnulo braun
- Re: [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions ianG
- Re: [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions ianG
- Re: [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions ianG
- Re: [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions Joe Touch
- Re: [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions ianG
- Re: [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions Joe Touch
- Re: [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions ianG
- Re: [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions Joe Touch
- Re: [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions Tony Arcieri
- Re: [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions Derek Fawcus
- Re: [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions Derek Fawcus
- Re: [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions Joe Touch
- Re: [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions Stephen Kent
- Re: [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions Joe Touch
- Re: [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions ianG
- Re: [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions Sandy Harris
- Re: [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions Joe Touch
- Re: [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Tcpcrypt] Initial questions Tero Kivinen