Re: [Tcpcrypt] New version of the charter text

[ianG <[e-mail]>]

On 27/04/2014 22:07 pm, Tony Arcieri wrote:
> On Sun, Apr 27, 2014 at 2:01 PM, ianG <[e-mail]
> <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
> 
>     Well.  I think the RFC should list it as a MAY so that people who read
>     it can be alerted to the fact that they had better figure out how this
>     happens and make sure it never happens on their watch.
> 
>     I don't think it should be a SHOULD because I've yet to see a valid
>     reason for it.  All of the reasons so far presented have been handwavy,
>     very edge-case or development only.
> 
>     And I don't see its place in the Charter.  It seems like cursing the
>     baby before its been born.
> 
> 
> I'm not even sure why it's being considered for the charter.


I don't understand it either.  But if you look at the tcp-crypt draft,
it's firmly in there.

http://tcpcrypt.org/draft-bittau-tcp-crypt.txt

This may be a cultural thing.  Us user folk might just not want it, but
in the WG world it might be something they can't conceive of not
mandating.  I await with interest the reasons...

However, what I'm more concerned about is that in the draft, it does the
old "cipher suite negotiation" thing.  I would have thought that was so
obviously unrequired, but apparently not.  If we have cipher suite
negotiation in there, talking about the universal kill switch is rather
moot because someone will slip in some bad ciphers.

Interesting debates ahead I suspect.  Keep your powder dry.



iang


> This is not
> a feature offered by, say, full disk encryption software, even though
> people may wind up double encrypting files. It's also proven not to be a
> problem in practice, even though the need to decrypt bypasses things
> like DMA.
> 
> It seems even less important for ubiquitous network encryption, where
> the network is far more likely to be the bottleneck. 
> 
> -- 
> Tony Arcieri