Re: [tcpinc] Resumption safety (was "Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt-09: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)")

"Valery Smyslov" <svanru@gmail.com> Tue, 12 December 2017 06:50 UTC

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From: "Valery Smyslov" <svanru@gmail.com>
To: "'Kyle Rose'" <krose@krose.org>, "'Black, David'" <David.Black@dell.com>
Cc: "'Eric Rescorla'" <ekr@rtfm.com>, "'tcpinc'" <tcpinc@ietf.org>, "'Mirja Kuehlewind \(IETF\)'" <ietf@kuehlewind.net>
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Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2017 09:50:57 +0300
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Subject: Re: [tcpinc] Resumption safety (was "Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt-09: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)")
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Hi Kyle,

> The more I look into this, the more convinced I am that SIV-like
> constructions are the only way to entirely avoid catastrophic loss of
> security. 

That was exactly my point.

To otherwise deal completely with the problem of VM cloning
> involves the invasive complexity of layer violation. That said, I
> don't think we want to take that step at this late date, but we should
> recognize the benefits and limitations of adding nonces and look into
> adding GCM-SIV (and related) cipher modes as future TEPs.

The issue is not tcpcrypt specific. TLS, IPsec and other
security protocols that use counter-based cipher modes 
are likely to be vulnerable to VM cloning/resumption problem as well.

That's why I agree that we shouldn't take any steps now (in a hurry and for 
tcpcrypt only). The problem should be recognized and addressed 
in a more generic way.

> Kyle

Regards,
Valery.