Re: [tcpm] Using the ECN Nonce to detect spurious loss events
Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Thu, 31 March 2011 09:36 UTC
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From: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2011 11:38:03 +0200
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To: "Scheffenegger, Richard" <rs@netapp.com>
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Cc: tcpm@ietf.org, michawe <michawe@ifi.uio.no>
Subject: Re: [tcpm] Using the ECN Nonce to detect spurious loss events
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On Wed, Mar 16, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Scheffenegger, Richard <rs@netapp.com>wrote: > Hi Michael, > > I believe that your goal is very worthwhile - detecting spurious > retransmissions and fixing the CC reaction. > > But neither ECN nor ECN-nounce are very widely deployed (in comparison with > Timestamp - Eifel; SACK - DSACK). Hopefully, the state of ECN will improve > with IPv6 (and now, that a number of major OS allow enabling ECN, even > though it's not enabled by default). > AFAIK TCP-TS is supported in Microsoft Windows but not enabled by default. Maybe TCP-TS can not considered widely-deployed? However, as the number of SACK (DSACK) enabled sessions is already quite > high, and there is less (no) state required in the server to discriminate > spurious retransmissions with very high probability. I think documenting the > proper response to DSACK (only the signaling is currently documented, IIRC) > may be more valuable to drive adoption with commercial stacks - often stacks > actively signal DSACK, but don't process that feedback themselves... > Linux already (partially) implements RFC4015? > > Overall, I'm afraid I don't see that efforts to improve your scheme would > see much deployment because of all these reasons. > After Michael's clarification, I like the idea a lot more In particular, I see the value in data centers: 1) receivers won't cheat (hopefully) 2) if (fast) retransmission was sent within the TS granular (e.g. 1ms), the detection has to rely on DSACK instead (2+ RTT slower)
- [tcpm] Using the ECN Nonce to detect spurious los… michawe
- Re: [tcpm] Using the ECN Nonce to detect spurious… Scheffenegger, Richard
- Re: [tcpm] Using the ECN Nonce to detect spurious… michawe
- Re: [tcpm] Using the ECN Nonce to detect spurious… Scheffenegger, Richard
- Re: [tcpm] Using the ECN Nonce to detect spurious… michawe
- Re: [tcpm] Using the ECN Nonce to detect spurious… Yuchung Cheng