Re: [tcpm] About the SYN/ACK-timer

Jakob Heitz <jakob.heitz@ericsson.com> Mon, 31 December 2012 19:24 UTC

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From: Jakob Heitz <jakob.heitz@ericsson.com>
To: Michael Welzl <michawe@ifi.uio.no>, "tcpm (tcpm@ietf.org)" <tcpm@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [tcpm] About the SYN/ACK-timer
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Date: Mon, 31 Dec 2012 19:24:28 +0000
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Subject: Re: [tcpm] About the SYN/ACK-timer
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I have an alternative to cookies.

Send data with the SYN.
When retransmission of the SYN is required, retransmit it without the data.
Retransmit the SYN quickly: 100 to 200 mS.

It works with Middleboxes.
SYN flood protection works as normal, just bias it against SYN with data.

Cheers,
Jakob.

On Dec 31, 2012, at 1:44 AM, "Michael Welzl" <michawe@ifi.uio.no> wrote:

> Hi,
> 
> About data-in-the-SYN: I agree with Joe that this has been debated a lot already - see https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tcpm-fastopen-02 and the discussions surrounding it. FWIW this draft is a (IMHO, good) proposal to do what you want, in the right way
> 
> Cheers,
> Michael
> 
> 
> On Dec 30, 2012, at 10:17 PM, Joe Touch <touch@isi.edu> wrote:
> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Dec 30, 2012, at 11:23 AM, Jakob Heitz <jakob.heitz@ericsson.com> wrote:
>> 
>>> On Dec 30, 2012, at 10:46 AM, "Joe Touch" <touch@isi.edu> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> ...if it is to have any real effect. You can send data in the SYN now, but the server can't deliver it to the app layer until the three-way handshake completes. And it also increases the amount of state for pending connections, increasing the impact of DOS attacks.
>>>> 
>>>> Joe
>>> 
>>> It could, with a change to the sockets API.
>> 
>> No, it cannot without a change in CTO semantics, which affects the state diagram and its processing on both ends - which also changes the meaning of an ack and the concept of reliability. 
>> 
>> There is a lot required, and for the first connection to a site it won't work to allow the server to act on data before a connection has been established. 
>> 
>> This is well- trod ground. 
>> 
>> Joe
>> 
>>> Of course, the app will need to participate in SYN flood protection, but that's not impossible given the right architecture.
>>> 
>>> --
>>> Jakob Heitz.
>>> 
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>