[tcpm] Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-ghost-acks-06.txt

Michael Tuexen <michael.tuexen@lurchi.franken.de> Thu, 02 July 2026 17:00 UTC

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Subject: [tcpm] Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-ghost-acks-06.txt
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> On 2. Jul 2026, at 17:44, yepeng.pan <yepeng.pan@cispa.de> wrote:
> 
> Hi All,
> 
> I just read the current 07 draft once more. 
> It feels the current section 3 could be merged into section 2 and would also provide better transition;
> For example:
> 
> > 2. Ghost ACKs:
>     ...
>   As a concrete example, consider a newly established TCP connection without data transferred during the handshake. There is SND.UNA == SND.NXT == ISS + 1.In this case, any segments with SEG.ACK < SND.UNA acknowledges bytes that the endpoint has never sent, but they are still considered acceptable since they satisfy the above SEG.ACK validation condition.
>   Ghost ACKs thus ease blind payload injection attacks, particularly for newly established TCP connections and potentially spoofed TCP connections.
> 
> and then section 3 can be removed.
OK.

Please go ahead and resubmit a new revision with that change.

Best regards
Michael
> 
> 
> 
> Best regards
> Yepeng Pan
> 
> On 7/2/2026 12:04 PM, Michael Tuexen wrote:
>>> On 2. Jul 2026, at 03:46, Yoshifumi Nishida <nsd.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Hi Michael,
>>> 
>>> Thanks for the reply. I put my comments in lines.
>>> 
>>> On Mon, Jun 29, 2026 at 11:29 AM Michael Tuexen <michael.tuexen@lurchi.franken.de> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 2: Section 4.1 
>>>> TCP stacks that implement this mitigation SHOULD add the additional boolean 
>>>> state variable NO_ISS_CHECK for each established connection. This variable 
>>>> SHOULD be initialized to false. At the beginning of the SEG.ACK validation, 
>>>> it SHOULD be checked if the ISS is still needed:
>>>> 
>>>> Should we use MUST instead of SHOULD if we don't have other choice?
>>>> 
>>> The code was using a mixture of SHOULD and MUST. I think needs to be
>>> consistent. I suggested SHOULD, since, for example, the FreeBSD implementation
>>> does not use a boolean variable, but a flag on the TCPCB. I guess this is
>>> covered by a SHOULD, but not by a MUST.
>>> 
>>> OK. If there are other ways, I'm fine with SHOULD.
>>> > Also, I'm wondering if we need the last sentence with RFC2119 word. 
>>> 
>>>> Something like the following might be enough?
>>>> 
>>>> This variable SHOULD be initialized to false in order to check if ISS check is needed
>>>> 
>>> There are two things here:
>>> 1. How NO_ISS_CHECK is initialized. This happens when the endpoint is created.
>>> 2. At the beginning of the SEG.ACK validation it should be check if the ISS based check
>>> is needed. This happens every time an incoming TCP segment is processed.
>>> So I think keeping the two things in separate sentences is a good thing. They happen
>>> at different times. Therefore, both should use RFC 2119 terminology.
>>> I agree, the wording of the last sentence can be improved. What about:
>>> 
>>> At the beginning of the <tt>SEG.ACK</tt> validation, it <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>
>>> be determined if the <tt>ISS</tt>-based check is still needed:</t>
>>> 
>>> Yes, works for me. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 4: Section 4.2
>>>> A local variable ACK.MIN SHOULD be computed, which is used to validate the SEG.ACK.
>>>> 
>>>> SHOULD -> MUST? if there is no other choice
>>>> 
>>> See above. Here, you could avoid using the local variable, but compute its value
>>> whenever needed. Covered by a SHOULD, but not by a MUST.
>>> 
>>> OK. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 5: Section 4.2 
>>>> An implementation has to deal with tcpEStatsAppHCThruOctetsAcked overflows.
>>>> 
>>>> This may look a bit ambiguous guidance. How about something like this?
>>>> 
>>>> An implementation MAY handle tcpEStatsAppHCThruOctetsAcked overflow.
>>>> 
>>> What about SHOULD? As far as I know, Linux does not handle it...
>>> 
>>> SHOULD is also fine for me.
>>> 
>> Great. All your comments have been addressed in revision 07.
>> 
>> Best regards
>> Michael
>> 
>>> --
>>> Yoshi 
>>> _______________________________________________
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>>> 
>>