Re: [tcpm] On TCP option codepoints
Joe Touch <touch@isi.edu> Tue, 08 October 2013 17:30 UTC
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Date: Tue, 08 Oct 2013 10:30:20 -0700
From: Joe Touch <touch@isi.edu>
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To: Wesley Eddy <wes@mti-systems.com>
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Subject: Re: [tcpm] On TCP option codepoints
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On 10/8/2013 10:25 AM, Joe Touch wrote: > FWIW, the IANA page already indicates some of these as known > unauthorized uses; > > http://www.iana.org/assignments/tcp-parameters/tcp-parameters.xhtml Correction - some of these were known, but didn't seem to make it as tagged as "known unauthorized use" yet. That should be updated. However, mention in a web page doesn't necessarily mean actual use. The other known unauthorized uses have been confirmed. Joe > AFAICT, IANA doesn't point to details on those unauthorized uses, to > avoid implicitly endorsing them. > > Joe > > On 10/8/2013 8:14 AM, Wesley Eddy wrote: >> On 10/8/2013 8:49 AM, Scharf, Michael (Michael) wrote: >>> Hi all, >>> >>> I've performed today a small and very nonscientific experiment: >>> >>> For all TCP option codepoints N marked as "Reserved" on >>> http://www.iana.org/assignments/tcp-parameters/tcp-parameters.xhtml, >>> I entered the term "tcp option N" in a major Internet search engine >>> and applied a special, human ranking by post-processing the first 5 >>> results for the exact match, if available. To ensure that only the >>> data analysis tool is proprietary and biased, but not in the data >>> source, I also verified the key result in a second major search >>> engine, and I used hex values for N as well ;) >> >> >> Nice idea; thanks for doing this! >> >> >>> - For N= 38 (0x26), there are several links to official product >>> documentation >>> >> >> >> In at least this case, where there is evidence that deployed products >> have stolen the codepoint, there should be an indication on the IANA >> webpage, similar to the existing ones. I think it's best if the >> responsible AD for TCPM handles this (sorry Martin!) though. >> >> In my personal opinion, the number of codepoint thefts is significant >> enough (and showing no signs of stopping) that instead of the generic >> statement about unauthorized use on all of them, we should specifically >> mention the vendors and products known to be abusing them. That way, >> if at some point those products go away and become obsolete, then the >> codepoints can be reaped back for legitimate use. >> >>
- [tcpm] On TCP option codepoints Scharf, Michael (Michael)
- Re: [tcpm] On TCP option codepoints Wesley Eddy
- Re: [tcpm] On TCP option codepoints Joe Touch
- Re: [tcpm] On TCP option codepoints Joe Touch
- Re: [tcpm] On TCP option codepoints Wesley Eddy
- Re: [tcpm] On TCP option codepoints Joe Touch
- Re: [tcpm] On TCP option codepoints Mark Allman
- Re: [tcpm] On TCP option codepoints Scharf, Michael (Michael)
- Re: [tcpm] On TCP option codepoints Joe Touch