Re: [tcpm] On TCP option codepoints

Joe Touch <touch@isi.edu> Tue, 08 October 2013 17:30 UTC

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Date: Tue, 08 Oct 2013 10:30:20 -0700
From: Joe Touch <touch@isi.edu>
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Subject: Re: [tcpm] On TCP option codepoints
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On 10/8/2013 10:25 AM, Joe Touch wrote:
> FWIW, the IANA page already indicates some of these as known
> unauthorized uses;
>
> http://www.iana.org/assignments/tcp-parameters/tcp-parameters.xhtml

Correction - some of these were known, but didn't seem to make it as
tagged as "known unauthorized use" yet. That should be updated.

However, mention in a web page doesn't necessarily mean actual use. The 
other known unauthorized uses have been confirmed.

Joe

> AFAICT, IANA doesn't point to details on those unauthorized uses, to
> avoid implicitly endorsing them.
>
> Joe
>
> On 10/8/2013 8:14 AM, Wesley Eddy wrote:
>> On 10/8/2013 8:49 AM, Scharf, Michael (Michael) wrote:
>>> Hi all,
>>>
>>> I've performed today a small and very nonscientific experiment:
>>>
>>> For all TCP option codepoints N marked as "Reserved" on
>>> http://www.iana.org/assignments/tcp-parameters/tcp-parameters.xhtml,
>>> I entered the term "tcp option N" in a major Internet search engine
>>> and applied a special, human ranking by post-processing the first 5
>>> results for the exact match, if available. To ensure that only the
>>> data analysis tool is proprietary and biased, but not in the data
>>> source, I also verified the key result in a second major search
>>> engine, and I used hex values for N as well ;)
>>
>>
>> Nice idea; thanks for doing this!
>>
>>
>>> - For N= 38 (0x26), there are several links to official product
>>> documentation
>>>
>>
>>
>> In at least this case, where there is evidence that deployed products
>> have stolen the codepoint, there should be an indication on the IANA
>> webpage, similar to the existing ones.  I think it's best if the
>> responsible AD for TCPM handles this (sorry Martin!) though.
>>
>> In my personal opinion, the number of codepoint thefts is significant
>> enough (and showing no signs of stopping) that instead of the generic
>> statement about unauthorized use on all of them, we should specifically
>> mention the vendors and products known to be abusing them.  That way,
>> if at some point those products go away and become obsolete, then the
>> codepoints can be reaped back for legitimate use.
>>
>>