Re: [tcpm] I-D Action:draft-ietf-tcpm-tcpsecure-12.txt

"Anantha Ramaiah (ananth)" <ananth@cisco.com> Mon, 14 September 2009 15:48 UTC

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Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2009 08:49:30 -0700
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Thread-Topic: [tcpm] I-D Action:draft-ietf-tcpm-tcpsecure-12.txt
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From: "Anantha Ramaiah (ananth)" <ananth@cisco.com>
To: "tcpm Extensions WG" <tcpm@ietf.org>
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Cc: Fernando Gont <fernando@gont.com.ar>
Subject: Re: [tcpm] I-D Action:draft-ietf-tcpm-tcpsecure-12.txt
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This basically has :

The agreed upon Last Call comments incorporated.

   I have checked all the comments received and have incorporated the
ones which are agreed upon. Briefly :
 - new template
- No IPR disclsoures on IETF documents, the RFC editor would do what is
needed. Brian clarified this.
- Addressed the last call comments by Brian Carpenter.
- Fernando's Last call comments agreed upon (added references to RFC
1948 and port randomization). 
- Sandra Murphy's comments whichever has been agreed upon.
- misc (typos etc.,)

Thanks,
Anantha

> -----Original Message-----
> From: tcpm-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:tcpm-bounces@ietf.org] On 
> Behalf Of Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
> Sent: Monday, September 14, 2009 8:30 AM
> To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
> Cc: tcpm@ietf.org
> Subject: [tcpm] I-D Action:draft-ietf-tcpm-tcpsecure-12.txt
> 
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line 
> Internet-Drafts directories.
> This draft is a work item of the TCP Maintenance and Minor 
> Extensions Working Group of the IETF.
> 
> 
> 	Title           : Improving TCP's Robustness to Blind 
> In-Window Attacks
> 	Author(s)       : A. Ramaiah, et al.
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-tcpm-tcpsecure-12.txt
> 	Pages           : 26
> 	Date            : 2009-09-14
> 
> TCP has historically been considered protected against 
> spoofed off- path packet injection attacks by relying on the 
> fact that it is difficult to guess the 4-tuple (the source 
> and destination IP addresses and the source and destination 
> ports) in combination with the 32 bit sequence number(s).  A 
> combination of increasing window sizes and applications using 
> longer term connections (e.g.  H-323 or Border Gateway 
> Protocol [RFC4271]) have left modern TCP implementations more 
> vulnerable to these types of spoofed packet injection attacks.
> 
> Many of these long term TCP applications tend to have 
> predictable IP addresses and ports which makes it far easier 
> for the 4-tuple (4-tuple is the same as the socket pair 
> mentioned in [RFC0793]) to be guessed.  Having guessed the 
> 4-tuple correctly, an attacker can inject a TCP segment with 
> the RST bit set, the SYN bit set or data into a TCP 
> connection by systematically guessing the sequence number of 
> the spoofed segment to be in the current receive window.  
> This can cause the connection to abort or cause data 
> corruption.  This document specifies small modifications to 
> the way TCP handles inbound segments that can reduce the 
> chances of a successful attack.
> 
> A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tcpm-tcpsecure-12.txt
> 
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
> 
> Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail 
> reader implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII 
> version of the Internet-Draft.
>