Re: [tcpm] draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-24 addressing all WGLC comments
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From: tuexen@fh-muenster.de
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Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2023 23:40:08 +0200
Cc: Yoshifumi Nishida <nsd.ietf@gmail.com>, Markku Kojo <kojo@cs.helsinki.fi>, tcpm <tcpm@ietf.org>, Bob Briscoe <ietf@bobbriscoe.net>
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Subject: Re: [tcpm] draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-24 addressing all WGLC comments
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> On 19. Jun 2023, at 12:38, Bob Briscoe (IC) <bob_briscoe@apple.com> wrote: > > Michael, > > The rule in RFC2026 is "Standards track specifications normally must not depend on other standards track specifications which are at a lower maturity level or on non standards track specifications". My thinking for making SACK and ECN++ informative refs was that recommendation in itself does not create a dependency. This is also my understanding of what is the plan. > The more clear-cut test is that the AccECN spec is defined for the case without ECN++ and without SACK, so I think that means it doesn’t depend on them. OK. So can you use a term different from "RECOMMENDED"? > > > Nonetheless, following a promise to Markku (also on the list), I have added the following to the local copy of AccECN after this ref to ECN++: > "...or any equivalent future protocol that allows the ECN capability to be used on TCP control packets" > And I've similarly generalized all the refs to ECN++. > > Does that resolve this concern? My concern is about the wording similar to It is RECOMMENDED that AccECN is implemented alongside [I-D.ietf-tcpm-generalized-ecn]. RECOMMENDED is like SHOULD and therefore I'm not sure the reference can be Informative. I can double check with the AD on Wednesday... Best regards Michael > > > Bob > >> On 18 Jun 2023, at 22:03, tuexen@fh-muenster.de wrote: >> >>> On 5. Jun 2023, at 10:33, Yoshifumi Nishida <nsd.ietf@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> Hi folks, >>> >>> I just would like to put my personal views on ack on ack discussions here. >>> First, I think ack on ack has already has some precedences. >>> keep-alive logic can sent a pure ack for proving and expect an ack for it. >>> MPTCP uses 4 WHS and the 4th segment is an ack for the third ACK which is a pure ACK. >>> So, I'm not sure if we need to define some rules for ack-on-ack in the doc. >>> >>> Also, I'm a bit hesitant to define a detailed logic about how to distinguish an ack that carries ECN signals and a dup ack, such as using TS or SACK blocks. >>> I think such things are the part of experiments and should be described in other docs such as ECN++ or ackcc, etc. >>> I personally prefer the doc simply describes the possibilities of such mechanisms and provides general principles and guidelines. >>> >>> As far as I think, the Markku's examples that triggers false retransmissions makes sense. I think they are good examples to show how ack-on-ack can be tricky. >>> However, these examples are the case where both sides exchanges data simultaneously and I think there're other cases where we don't have to worry about it. >>> For example, I think bulk transfer or request-response type traffic can be these examples. >>> In these cases, the endpoint which receives acks for acks doesn't have outstanding data. Hence, although these acks are duplicate acks, they won't trigger retransmissions. >>> >>> So, I am thinking that it would be good to provide a certain guideline about when to enable this feature and potential risks in some docs. >>> But, I am also thinking we should do it outside of accecn doc. >> I agree that the ACK of ACK scenario is something which relates to the >> experimental ECN++ document. >> >> However, I checked again draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-24 and found at the >> paragraph right before Section 1.1: >> >> It is RECOMMENDED that the AccECN protocol is implemented alongside >> SACK [RFC2018] and the experimental ECN++ protocol >> [I-D.ietf-tcpm-generalized-ecn], which allows the ECN capability to >> be used on TCP control packets. >> >> Would using I-D.ietf-tcpm-generalized-ecn in combination with RECOMMENDED >> not required the ID to be a normative reference? I couldn't find clear rules, >> but in my view I could not argument against it. Since the intended status >> of I-D.draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn is PS and the intended status of >> I-D.ietf-tcpm-generalized-ecn is Experiemental, this would be a downref. >> >> Is this really intended by the authors or just a leftover? >> >> Best regards >> Michael >>> >>> Thanks, >>> -- >>> Yoshi >>> >>> >>> On Fri, May 26, 2023 at 2:56 PM Markku Kojo <kojo@cs.helsinki.fi> wrote: >>> Bob, >>> >>> My apologies you had to wait for the scenarios as it took much longer >>> with my limited cycles than I thought. Anyways, please see my reply to >>> Richard, some scenarios are also included there. >>> >>> To keep things easier, it might be good to try to keep the discussion on >>> Acks of Acks (mainly) in the thread with my reply to Richard. >>> >>> However, see inline tagged [MK]. >>> >>> On Wed, 24 May 2023, Bob Briscoe wrote: >>> >>>> Markku, >>>> >>>> Sorry, it's taken a week to build a comprehensive reply to this long email. See inline tagged >>>> [BB]... >>>> >>>> On 17/05/2023 12:24, Markku Kojo wrote: >>>> Hi Michael, all, >>>> >>>> On Sun, 14 May 2023, tuexen@fh-muenster.de wrote: >>>> >>>> On 30. Mar 2023, at 16:53, Bob Briscoe <ietf@bobbriscoe.net> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Michael, Yoshi, Ian (as tcpm chairs), >>>> >>>> To close off the WGLC, I have just posted a new rev of >>>> accurate-ecn. Hyperlinks quoted at the end. >>>> You will see the diff is rather extensive. I won't give a >>>> summary of all the diffs like I usually do. Instead I can just >>>> refer to the summary I gave in the presentation on Monday: >>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/116/materials/slides-116-tcpm-draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn >>>> >>>> Thank you again to the people who reviewed this during the WGLC: >>>> Michael Tüxen, Alex Burr, Gorry Fairhurst and Markku Kojo. >>>> >>>> All changes are editorial, apart from removing the para about >>>> not mistaking certain ACKs of ACKs for DupACKs, which I will add >>>> to a rev of the ECN++ draft, hopefully later this week. >>>> >>>> On the list, we have seen agreement from all the reviewers to >>>> these changes, except no response from Markku yet. >>>> On Monday, I told Markku that I would post the draft in a few >>>> days, so everyone can see the updates and diff. >>>> >>>> Anyone having additional comments? In particular Markku regarding loss >>>> recovery? >>>> >>>> >>>> My apologies for being late with my reply to the author's comments on my review (I've >>>> been extremly busy with other issues since the wg mtng in Yokohama, including the rest >>>> of mtng week). >>>> >>>> I don't have much new comments but it seems that my major concern regarding the problem >>>> of sending ACKs of ACKs was not fully understood. >>>> >>>> The first thing where I think I was not quite clear is that the major problem with ACKs >>>> of ACKs is not that a pure Ack is made ECN-capable. Instead, the problem is in >>>> generating an Ack of an pure Ack and that is what one should prohibit to avoid problems. >>>> I understand that it might be problematic to formulate rules whether generating an Ack >>>> of an Ack is allowed (and when), instead of just disabling sending ECN-capable ACKs. >>>> I don't have a strong opinion which way the problems with ACKs of ACKs is avoided as >>>> long as they are avoided. >>>> >>>> >>>> [BB] See later after your similar point (following your 'Why?' heading)... >>>> >>>> >>>> I am preparing a few scenarios to illustriate the problems ACKs of ACks raise and will >>>> send them shortly once I have formulated a more thorough reasoning why sending ACKs of >>>> ACKs is not really a good idea and even seems to be unnecessary in most if not all >>>> cases, i.e., it just results in sending unnecessary packets with not much useful effect >>>> but creates a notable number of problems. >>>> >>>> >>>> [BB] Having waited this long, it's rather disappointing to still hear you say "I have an argument, >>>> but I'll tell you later." >>> >>> [MK] I understand. My sincere apologies again. >>> >>>> It also seems not have been carefully enough considered in terms of the very basic >>>> rubustness principle of "be conservative in what you send ..." >>>> >>>> >>>> [BB] The WG has been careful to ensure that ACKs of ACKs are unambiguous (cannot be mistaken for a >>>> DupACK), which is what the robustness principle requires. It's just that you think we have missed >>>> cases where they will be ambiguous. If you think that, we need to hear them all. >>>> >>>> The robustness principle does not advocate sending nothing just in case some unknown factor might >>>> make it ambiguous. Especially given /not/ feeding back congestion notifications has potential to >>>> cause harm to others. Also, "no feedback" is much more ambiguous. >>> >>> [MK] Please see my reply to Richard and let's continue from there. See >>> also what I meant with "be conservative in what you send ...", that is, >>> in context of CC: avoid sending unnecessary packets or be careful in >>> sending packets just because they might be sometimes useful, send the >>> monly when they are useful. >>> >>>> Given that this draft is intended to become a stds track RFC I am concerned of any text >>>> in this document that indicates (or even hints) that TCP could acknowledge pure ACKS >>>> (this holds particularly the rules and text in Sec 3.2.2.5.1 for the >>>> "Increment-Triggered ACKs"). If it is seen necessary that this doc should have such >>>> pieces of rules and text, I am fine if any such text is moved to an appendix as long as >>>> the appendix makes it cristal clear that the text is valid only in case one is >>>> implementing an experiment as per [I-D.ietf-tcpm-generalized-ecn]. >>>> >>>> >>>> [BB] See point below about "Generic (Mechanistic) Reflector". >>>> >>>> >>>> Why? >>>> >>>> 1) It is well known that TCP does not acknowledge ACKs and Standards track TCP has not >>>> been specified to acknowledge ACKs. This means that a reader/implementer of this doc >>>> cannot correctly understand the rule for "Increment-Triggered ACKs" unless there is a >>>> normative reference to a spec that specifies ACKs of ACKs (or tells that it is even >>>> possible). >>>> >>>> >>>> [BB] ACKs of ACKs can indeed be tricky. But there's no need to consider not ACKing ACKs as an >>>> architectural principle. Not Acking ACKs on principle certainly avoids some tricky problems. >>>> However, we have a new situation here where, in limited circumstances, ACKs of ACKs are necessary. >>>> So the WG has already worked through the tricky problems and they have been addressed in the draft >>>> (e.g. mistaking ACKs of ACKs for DupACks, infinite ping-pong, etc). We'll discuss below whether >>>> you've found some more trickiness. >>> >>> (MK] I did not mean to refer to any principle but, as I said, that a >>> reader/implementer cannot correctly understand the rule for >>> "Increment-Triggered ACKs" because it is well-known to her/him that TCP >>> does not Ack ACKs. This fact is that one can ack ACKs is not specified in >>> this doc nor does this doc give a (normative) reference where it is >>> specified, including the details on which TSecr value to add or which >>> SACK info if any to include when acking a pure Ack. It is easy to >>> misinterpret the "Increment-Triggered ACKs", if one doesn't realize that >>> pure Acks may be acked. >>> >>>> What is the new situation? >>>> * Until ECN was introduced, TCP ACKs only acknowledged data. So there was no need to acknowledge >>>> pure ACKs, which contain no data. >>>> * When ECN was introduced in RFC3168, TCP ACKs also acknowledged ECN markings. However, because >>>> RFC3168 precluded pure ACKs from being ECN-capable, there was still no need to acknowledge pure >>>> ACKs. >>>> * RFC5690, and now the ECN++ draft introduce the possibility of ECN-capable pure ACKs. So, in the >>>> limited circumstances described in the AccECN draft, ECN-capable pure ACKs now need to be >>>> acknowledged, because they contain new information - their ECN field. >>>> Similarly, even though the final ACK of TCP's 3WHS is an ACK of an ACK , it is sent because it is >>>> needed (to prove that the SYN wasn't from a spoofed address). >>> >>> [MK] All otherwise clear, but I disagree that the final ACK of TCP's 3WHS >>> is an ACK of an ACK. It is required because SYNACK contains control data >>> that eats one sequence number, i.e., it advances RCV.NXT at the client >>> end and when the ACK arrives at the server it is needed to advance >>> SND.UNA. Very different from Acks of Acks in this draft. >>> >>>> It is true that not ACKing ACKs is well-known. However, whether it's well-known as a /principle/, or >>>> just as a current /feature/ of TCP is not clear. Anyway, the IETF's job is to update RFCs that are >>>> "well-known". We don't have to jump through any special procedural hoops to do something different >>>> from what is "well-known". Even if it were prohibited in a stds track RFC, we just have to specify >>>> what has to be done instead; in another stds track RFC. >>> >>> [MK] Again, I didn't mention it as a /principle/ but as a crucial >>> piece of information that the reader needs to be noted, that is, the >>> things are now different from what is well-known. >>> >>> Sure IETF's job is to update RFCs, but if one changes what is prohibited >>> in a stds track RFC, one needs to understand the consequences and explain >>> them as well as give the justification why the change can be done (without >>> problems), instead of just specifying the change. >>> >>>> If there are any tutorials, course notes or text books out there that say that not ACKing ACKs is a >>>> well-known principle, that's not the IETF's problem. It is the job of the tutors, lecturers and text >>>> book authors who wrote those materials to update them. >>>> >>>> >>>> 2) ACKs of ACKs tend to trigger duplicate Acks. There are tons of algorithms that rely >>>> on the packet conservation principle and the fact that TCP never injects a dupAck unless >>>> a *data* packet has arrived and left the network. This is enforced with "MUST NOT" in >>>> RFC 5681, Sec 4.2, because not conforming to this rule makes any algorithm that rely on >>>> the rule to work incorrectly. These algorithms include (triggering) Fast Retransmit, >>>> (controlling packet rate during) Fast Recovery, (detecting spurious RTOs in) F-RTO, >>>> (calculating PipeAck in) RFC 7661, (calculating DeliveredData in) PRR, etc. Furthermore, >>>> it would make imposible to come up with any new algorihms that rely on this important >>>> basic rule. In most cases such extra dupAcks make these algorithms too aggressive >>>> because any extra dupAck is likely to inject extra packet(s) to the network. >>>> >>>> So, it should be cristal clear that without SACK (or Timestamps) a TCP *MUST NOT* send >>>> ACKs of ACKs. >>>> >>>> >>>> [BB] Constraining the /Data Receiver/ as you propose would create an interop problem. >>>> Explanation: Consider host A and B are not using SACK or timestamps. Nonetheless, with your >>>> approach, host A can still send ECN-capable pure ACKs to host B. Then, your rule puts host B in an >>>> impossible position, where it gets congestion notifications on ECN-capable pure ACKs, but it is not >>>> allowed to send any feedback about them. >>>> >>>> Instead, if neither timestamps nor SACK are in use for the connection, we need to constrain the >>>> /Data Sender/ of a half connection from sending ECN-capable ACKs in the first place. This is the >>>> approach the WG has adopted in the AccECN and ECN++ specs. >>> >>> [MK] I think I said in the beginning that I have no strong opinion which >>> way Acks of Acks are disabled. However, I apologize that I didn't explain >>> why I phrased MUST NOT send ACKs of ACKs. This is because it might be >>> still useful to allow CE-marked pure Acks and take care of Ack CC by some >>> other means than Acks of Acks. Currently the draft mandates Acks of Acks >>> as the only way to report Ack congestion and I think it is too >>> restrictive in a stds track doc, e.g., it rules out reducing Ack rate >>> simply by reducing data send rate which would solve the interop problem in >>> a very simple way. Moreover, When B gets congestion notifications on >>> ECN-capable pure ACKs, not sending Acks of Acks does not prevent sending >>> feedback; such feedback need not to be delivered immediately but by the >>> time needed. Please see more on this in my reply to Richard. >>> >>>> Specifically: >>>> * The WG makes sure that RFCs about the /Data Sender/ of a half connection (e.g. the ECN++ >>>> experiment or other future RFCs) specify that sending ECN-capable pure ACKs is conditional on >>>> having another way to distinguish DupACKs, e.g. negotiating SACK or timestamps (and I will >>>> respond to your later points on the details of these). >>>> * The AccECN spec (which primarily specifies the feedback behaviour of a /Data Receiver/ in a >>>> half-connection) then only needs to define the Increment-triggered ACK rule. >>>> The two together lead to the same outcome you want. But without the interop hole of your approach. >>>> >>>> This is consistent with the "Generic (Mechanistic) Reflector" approach of the AccECN spec which >>>> says: >>>> "AccECN is designed to be a generic reflector of whatever ECN markings it sees, whether or not they >>>> are compliant with a current standard." >>>> >>>> These ACKs of ACKs are generically necessary to feed back congestion notifications from possible >>>> incoming packet patterns, not specifically for ECN++ or AckCC [RFC5690], or any other future RFC >>>> (forward compatibility). We'll edit the reference to ECN++ to make it clearer that it's one example, >>>> not the only case. >>>> >>>> Here's another example of the generic reflector approach, already in the draft: >>>> "Although RFC 3168 prohibits an ECN-capable SYN, providing feedback of ECN marking on the SYN >>>> supports future scenarios in which SYNs might be ECN-enabled (without prejudging whether they ought >>>> to be). ... " >>>> >>>> >>>> So, it should be cristal clear that without SACK (or Timestamps) a TCP *MUST NOT* send >>>> ACKs of ACKs. >>>> >>>> >>>> I understand that you want this but, as just explained, without SACK or timestamps, the correct >>>> approach is to prevent the Data Sender putting the Data Receiver in the position where it would have >>>> to ACK ACKs in the first place. >>>> >>>> In a connection without SACK or timestamps, if the Data Receiver were to get lots of congestion >>>> notifications on ECN-capable ACKs, it would face a difficult dilemma. Which would be more important: >>>> Signalling congestion by ACKing ACKs? or ensuring the performance improvements like Fast Retransmit, >>>> Fast Recovery etc. work well? The former would prevent harm to others, the latter would prevent harm >>>> to self. >>> >>> [MK] Please see my reply to Richard to understand why Acks of Acks >>> cause Fast Retransmit, Fast Recovery, etc to cause harm to others in the >>> first place. And also why most of the Acks of Acks seem to be just >>> unnecessary load to the network, that is, they harm others without (much) >>> benefits. >>> >>>> Nonetheless, I will add some text to the AccECN draft that explains why it is important for other >>>> RFCs not to put a Data Receiver in the position where it has to ACK ACKs iff there is no way to >>>> distinguish them from DupACKs. >>>> >>>> >>>> 3) Even with SACK or Timestamps enabled it is not clear what an >>>> implementer should do. With SACK the AckECN authors seem to make an assumption, which >>>> seems obvious but is not, that an ACK of ACK would would never include SACK option and >>>> hence it could be distinguished from a dupAck. However, RFC 2018 specifies: "If sent at >>>> all, SACK options SHOULD be included in all ACKs which do not ACK the highest sequence >>>> number in the data receiver's queue. So, if there is a hole in the receiver's queue, the >>>> assumption is incorrect and it is unclear which SACK info to include into the SACK >>>> option. Whatever one selects to include, it makes DSACK (RFC 2883] void and breaks any >>>> DSACK-based algorithms unless RFC 2018 is updated. >>>> >>>> >>>> [BB] >>>> Reading the draft, it is very clear that there is no such assumption. The text said solely what it >>>> meant: >>>> >>>> ... a host in AccECN >>>> mode that is sending ECN-capable pure ACKs SHOULD add one of the >>>> following additional checks when it tests whether an incoming pure >>>> ACK is a duplicate: >>>> >>>> o If SACK has been negotiated for the connection, but there is no >>>> SACK option on the incoming pure ACK, it is not a duplicate; >>>> That is, if an incoming ACK were a duplicate, it would have a SACK option on it. This /relies/ on >>>> the rule in RFC2018 that you quote. So there is no need (nor intention) to change SACK behaviour in >>>> any way. >>> >>> [MK] Sorry I don't understand your claim. Assume A sends data pkts >>> 0,1,2,3,..,10 in the current window to B and pkt 1 is dropped. >>> Simultaneously, B sends data to A such that the data pkts arrive at A >>> after A has injected pkt 10 to the network. These pkts trigger pure >>> cumulative Acks from A to B that follow A's data pkts 1..10 and enough of >>> the Acks get CE-marked due to congestion path A to B. When pkts 2..10 >>> arrive at B, each of them trigger a valid dupAck with a SACK block >>> included. When the CE-marked Acks that follow data pkts 2..10 arrive at >>> B, B needs to feedback congestion info on them in Acks of Acks. These >>> Acks of Acks cannot cumulatively ACK the highest sequence number in the >>> data receiver's queue (pkt 10) since pkt 0 is the highest pkt >>> arrived insequence, so the Ack of Ack must include a SACK block as per >>> RFC 2018. What is the SACK block info that the implementer, who follows >>> carefully advice in RFC 2018 and there is no other advice, should >>> include in these Acks unless RFC 2018 is not changed? How does the >>> implementer know how to Ack, if it not specified? >>> >>>> (Note: to check this text, you'll need to refer to the previous AccECN draft here: >>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-23#section-3.2.2.5.1 >>>> It had been there since Jul 2021 (since -15). But, as explained above, it is longer in the latest >>>> AccECN draft (-24), because it has been moved to the editor's copy of the ECN++ draft, which I wrote >>>> on 4 Apr, but I've been waiting for your reply before submitting it.) >>>> >>>> >>>> With Timestamps some algorithms like Eifel detection breaks. Moreover, there are other >>>> existing or potentially to-be-created heauristics, including various measurement tools, >>>> that rely on the fact that TCP does not echo a later Timestamp in a pure Ack than what >>>> arrived with the latest data packet. Any such mechanisms are subject to break. >>>> >>>> >>>> [BB] I don't fully understand what you're saying here. Can you be clearer please? >>>> And can you please bear in mind that we are in the WGLC processing stage now. So review comments >>>> ought to be suggesting very specific changes to the text under review. >>> >>> [MK] Again, the same problem as with SACK. It is unspecified which >>> TSecr value to put in Acks of Acks. That has not been specified >>> anywhere, so how can I or anyone else check what breaks if anything, and >>> how can an implementer know which TSecr value to include in Acks of Acks? >>> >>> It is hard to propose specific changes to text that does not exist or to a >>> problem that seems to be a missing piece of design or a design flaw, until >>> the text exists or the intended design is known or the potentiel design >>> flaw is mutually agreed whether there is a flaw or not. >>> >>> (Please note also that the Eifel problem seems not to be serious, but >>> instead the timestamps rule you proposed to distinguish dupAcks from Acks >>> of Acks seems suspicious and calls for clarification). >>> >>> Please see more details in my reply to Richard. >>> >>>> Again, this text about extra DupACK checks has now been removed from AccECN and will shortly appear >>>> in the ECN++ draft instead. I shall post the new ECN++ draft shortly. >>>> >>>> >>>> It might be good to hold discussing any details on what breaks and how/why and what are >>>> the consequences until I have sent my reply with scenarios to Richard. >>>> >>>> >>>> [BB] Please try to prioritize any comments about the text that is now left in the AccECN draft. The >>>> WGLC of AccECN is waiting for no-one else at the moment. >>> >>> [MK] Unfortunately I was not able to do this, sorry. I got confused >>> already earlier when I was reviewing AccECN and ended up checking ECN++ >>> quickly as I noted that AccECN draft cited it for these issues. When >>> reading ECN++ I found Sec 3.3.3 and read: >>> >>> "The question of whether and how the receiver of pure ACKs is required to >>> feed back any CE marks on them is outside the scope of the present >>> specification because it is a matter for the relevant feedback >>> specification ([RFC3168] or [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn])." >>> >>> This got me totally confused together with the later discussion on the mic >>> at Yokohama mtng because that was what I had read, and I was not able to >>> understand what was intended to go where. And I still not quite know >>> but I think I have a better hunch. The above text still reads in >>> ECN++ draft, but hopefully not in editor's copy? >>> >>> Anyways, the major problem is not with any certain text phrases but >>> whether DupAck vs. Ack of Ack problem is solvable and whether >>> injecting Acks of Acks really is a needed and mature enough feature that >>> can be part of a stds track protocol. >>> >>>> But also bear in mind that the chairs plan to take ECN++ into WGLC once AccECN WGLC has been >>>> cleared. So we need to hear your actual argument about the DupACK text that has been moved to ECN++ >>>> urgently too. We can't work with "I have an argument, but I'll tell you later". >>> >>> [MK] Apologies for the delay again. Please see my reply to Richard for my >>> arguments. >>> >>>> One additional comment regarding the "Change-Triggered ACKs" rule is that it would be >>>> useful to make it more clear how this plays with delayed Acks and how it alters >>>> acknowledgement rate. >>>> I am not sure that what the draft currently says is quite correct: >>>> >>>> "The approach can lead to some additional ACKs but it feeds back >>>> the timing and the order in which ECN marks are received with minimal >>>> additional complexity. If CE marks are infrequent, as is the case for >>>> most AQMs at the time of writing, or there are multiple marks in a row, >>>> the additional load will be low. >>>> >>>> For example, consider a scenario with bidirectional traffic between A and B where B has >>>> a hole in sequence resulting in every data packet in the current RTT to become acked >>>> (pure duplicate Acks). This may result in a packet flow from A to B where every second >>>> packet is a pure (duplicate) Ack. If there is congestion on the path from A to B such >>>> that a significant number of (data) packets get marked, it may result in acking every >>>> data packet from A to B. This does not necessarily result in low additional load? >>>> >>>> >>>> [BB] I don't quite understand how every second packet from A to B is a pure duplicate ACK, but I >>>> don't think I need to - I'll assume it's somehow possible. >>>> >>>> Then I think you've somehow assumed that the data packets get CE-marked, but the interspersed pure >>>> ACKs don't (perhaps you're assuming that the pure ACKs in this case are not ECN-capable? Or perhaps >>>> you're assuming size-based packet marking?). Whatever, I agree that, if this scenario did occur, >>>> then the change-triggered ACK rule would indeed lead to B ACKing every data packet that arrives, >>>> with no delayed ACKs. {Note 1} >>>> >>>> Nonetheless, the draft is quite open about the implications of the change-triggered ACK rule on ACK >>>> rate. In the sentence straight after the ones you quote, it says: >>>> "However, marking patterns with numerous non-contiguous CE marks could increase the load >>>> significantly." >>>> And a little earlier it starts out by saying: >>>> "...the 'Change-Triggered ACKs' rule could sometimes cause the ACK rate to be problematic for >>>> high performance" >>>> >>>> I don't think we need to include examples of how non-contiguous CE marking could occur. And if we >>>> did, I'd prefer to use one that was less complex to explain, e.g. a high level of probabilistic AQM >>>> marking. But thank you for this point anyway. >>> >>> [MK] Thanks for pointing these additional sentences. I somehow missed >>> them and/or did not manage to relate them to the text I quoted. I think >>> this is good enough to address the case I raised, particularly "numerous >>> non-contiguous CE marks could increase the load significantly." >>> >>>> {Note 1}: It's ironic that the existing behaviour "where B has a hole in sequence" also results "in >>>> every data packet in the current RTT to become acked" (by A). I'm not giving this as an excuse for >>>> introducing another case with the same bad behaviour. I'm just highlighting the irony. >>> >>> [MK] Maybe ironic but the fact that a hole in sequence results in every >>> data packet in RTT to become acked has a very good reason being as it is >>> because those dupAcks directly control the data rate per the packet >>> conservation principle in various important algos at the data sender, >>> such as Fast Recovery, and this behaviour is therefore a crucial part of >>> such congestion control algos. >>> >>> Best regards, >>> >>> /Markku >>> >>>> >>>> Regards >>>> >>>> >>>> Bob >>>> >>>> >>>> Best regards, >>>> >>>> /Markku >>>> >>>> >>>> Best regards >>>> Michael >>>> >>>> Cheers >>>> >>>> >>>> Bob >>>> >>>> On 30/03/2023 15:15, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote: >>>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line >>>> Internet-Drafts >>>> directories. This Internet-Draft is a work item of >>>> the TCP Maintenance and >>>> Minor Extensions (TCPM) WG of the IETF. >>>> >>>> Title : More Accurate Explicit >>>> Congestion Notification (ECN) Feedback in TCP >>>> Authors : Bob Briscoe >>>> Mirja Kühlewind >>>> Richard Scheffenegger >>>> Filename : >>>> draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-24.txt >>>> Pages : 64 >>>> Date : 2023-03-30 >>>> >>>> Abstract: >>>> Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) is a >>>> mechanism where network >>>> nodes can mark IP packets instead of dropping >>>> them to indicate >>>> incipient congestion to the endpoints. Receivers >>>> with an ECN-capable >>>> transport protocol feed back this information to >>>> the sender. ECN was >>>> originally specified for TCP in such a way that >>>> only one feedback >>>> signal can be transmitted per Round-Trip Time >>>> (RTT). Recent new TCP >>>> mechanisms like Congestion Exposure (ConEx), Data >>>> Center TCP (DCTCP) >>>> or Low Latency, Low Loss, and Scalable Throughput >>>> (L4S) need more >>>> accurate ECN feedback information whenever more >>>> than one marking is >>>> received in one RTT. This document updates the >>>> original ECN >>>> specification in RFC 3168 to specify a scheme >>>> that provides more than >>>> one feedback signal per RTT in the TCP header. >>>> Given TCP header >>>> space is scarce, it allocates a reserved header >>>> bit previously >>>> assigned to the ECN-Nonce. It also overloads the >>>> two existing ECN >>>> flags in the TCP header. The resulting extra >>>> space is exploited to >>>> feed back the IP-ECN field received during the >>>> 3-way handshake as >>>> well. Supplementary feedback information can >>>> optionally be provided >>>> in two new TCP option alternatives, which are >>>> never used on the TCP >>>> SYN. The document also specifies the treatment >>>> of this updated TCP >>>> wire protocol by middleboxes. >>>> >>>> The IETF datatracker status page for this >>>> Internet-Draft is: >>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn/ >>>> >>>> There is also an htmlized version available at: >>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-24 >>>> >>>> A diff from the previous version is available at: >>>> https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-24 >>>> >>>> Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at >>>> rsync.ietf.org::internet-drafts >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> tcpm mailing list >>>> tcpm@ietf.org >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tcpm >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> ________________________________________________________________ >>>> Bob Briscoe http://bobbriscoe.net/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> ________________________________________________________________ >>>> Bob Briscoe http://bobbriscoe.net/ >>>> >>>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> tcpm mailing list >>> tcpm@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tcpm > >
- [tcpm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-2… internet-drafts
- [tcpm] draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-24 addressing… Bob Briscoe
- Re: [tcpm] draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-24 addres… tuexen
- Re: [tcpm] draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-24 addres… Markku Kojo
- Re: [tcpm] draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-24 addres… Bob Briscoe
- Re: [tcpm] draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-24 addres… Markku Kojo
- Re: [tcpm] draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-24 addres… Yoshifumi Nishida
- Re: [tcpm] draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-24 addres… Bob Briscoe
- Re: [tcpm] draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-24 addres… tuexen
- Re: [tcpm] draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-24 addres… tuexen
- Re: [tcpm] draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-24 addres… tuexen
- Re: [tcpm] draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-24 addres… Bob Briscoe (IC)
- Re: [tcpm] draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-24 addres… Bob Briscoe (IC)
- Re: [tcpm] draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-24 addres… Markku Kojo
- Re: [tcpm] draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-24 addres… Markku Kojo
- Re: [tcpm] draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-24 addres… Yoshifumi Nishida
- Re: [tcpm] draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-24 addres… Bob Briscoe