Re: [Teas] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-ietf-teas-fast-lsps-requirements-01: (with DISCUSS)

["Andrew G. Malis" <[e-mail]>]

Stephen,

Note that this draft discusses GMPLS-based signaling for wavelengths and
TDM circuits, not layer 3 MPLS-based LSPs that are covered by your draft.
Layer 3 encryption cannot be used, since the payload is arbitrary bit
streams typically at optical wavelength speeds.

Does this address your comment?

Thanks,
Andy


On Wed, Sep 30, 2015 at 6:29 PM, Stephen Farrell <[e-mail]>
wrote:

> Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-teas-fast-lsps-requirements-01: Discuss
>
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> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-teas-fast-lsps-requirements/
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>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> DISCUSS:
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>
>
> Are these reqs consistent with an additional RTT for key exchange?
> If not, why is that ok? 100 setups/second implies a real need for a
> 0RTT model for any key exchange. That has significant protocol
> design implications. I think you only need to note that, but that
> noting that is really needed. (This could for example affect the
> details of [1] or of later work similar to or built on [1]. Full
> disclosure: I'm a co-author of [1].)
>
>    [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-mpls-opportunistic-encrypt
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