Re: Telnet encryption

Philippe-Andre Prindeville <> Fri, 09 February 1996 07:02 UTC

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Date: Fri, 9 Feb 96 07:58:25 +0100
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From: Philippe-Andre Prindeville <>
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In-Reply-To: "Richard Basch" <> "Telnet encryption" (Feb 8, 12:31)
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To: Richard Basch <>
Subject: Re: Telnet encryption
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Excuse me here... I'm a telnet hack and not a cryptologist...

How about having a mechanism whereby two machines that have
previously not communicated and are not under the same
administrative umbrella can communicate securely with each
other?  Say, DES with Diffie-Hillman key exchange?

I see it as two different problems also.  That the remote
machine relies on a weak authentication mechanism such as
the UNIX password file is a separate problem to be solved
elsewhere.  My gripe is that I don't want my password going
in cleartext over the network, and not everyone does S/Key.

Why can't we focus our attention on this?

If Jeff is watching this he will probably flame me for being
naive.  He may be right...