Re: [TLS] Proposal: a TLS formal analysis triage panel
Muhammad Usama Sardar <muhammad_usama.sardar@tu-dresden.de> Mon, 18 March 2024 16:48 UTC
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Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2024 17:30:04 +0100
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To: Deirdre Connolly <durumcrustulum@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Proposal: a TLS formal analysis triage panel
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On 18.03.24 16:56, Deirdre Connolly wrote: > I do think a 'reference' Tamarin model would be useful. Why should it be a Tamarin model? Why not a ProVerif model? > It would of course only model part of TLS (1.3, for example) and only > through a particular symbolic model/tool. And would require > maintenance by...someone. > Are you expecting any major changes in TLS 1.3? If not, then I think the baseline formal model will not change a lot. So probably there is not much maintenance required. I think it is just a one-time effort to create well-understood and well-reviewed formal artifacts as a baseline, and then most extensions (for which formal analysis is signaled by the panel) can use this baseline. Also, TLS WG can work together with UFMRG to achieve this. > For the triage panel, I do think the preliminary triage is key: we'd > ask a group of experts /if/ formal analysis (new or updated) is > warranted /at all/, and if warranted, of what kind, what scope, if it > needs novel modeling work, if it can build on existing work, or even > if pen and paper analysis would suffice. I do not think there are any > prerequisites to standing such a triage panel up. > Agree. However, the baseline for each "kind" (e.g., one for symbolic and one for computational and within symbolic, one for ProVerif and one for Tamarin) will still be helpful to avoid repetitive work.
- [TLS] Proposal: a TLS formal analysis triage panel Deirdre Connolly
- Re: [TLS] Proposal: a TLS formal analysis triage … David Schinazi
- Re: [TLS] Proposal: a TLS formal analysis triage … Deirdre Connolly
- Re: [TLS] Proposal: a TLS formal analysis triage … Jonathan Hoyland
- Re: [TLS] Proposal: a TLS formal analysis triage … Muhammad Usama Sardar
- Re: [TLS] Proposal: a TLS formal analysis triage … Deirdre Connolly
- Re: [TLS] Proposal: a TLS formal analysis triage … Muhammad Usama Sardar
- Re: [TLS] Proposal: a TLS formal analysis triage … Marc Petit-Huguenin
- Re: [TLS] [Ufmrg] Proposal: a TLS formal analysis… Bas Spitters