Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding
Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com> Sat, 24 September 2016 01:17 UTC
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From: Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 24 Sep 2016 01:17:22 +0000
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To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>, Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>, Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding
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Signature algorithm support is typically per-connection, not per certificate request. If you're doing multiple post-handshake authentications then (2) reduces the amount of redundant data sent on subsequent authentications. Furthermore, it opens the door for unsolicited post-handshake authentication in future extensions to the protocol. Clients only need to stash a copy of it if they support client authentication, which in my opinion should be optional. Perhaps support for post-handshake authentication should be signaled with an extension. That way the server SignatureSchemes could be carried in that extension, rather than overloading the "signature_algorithms" extension. On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 5:56 PM David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> wrote: > (1) seems reasonable. I don't have strong views there. I even jokingly > suggested it in the PR description. > > I do not like (2). This requires implementations stash a copy of the > signature algorithms without known a priori whether it will be used or not. > And it means when receiving a CertificateRequest, you have to go check that > the extension was provided at all. I think that should stay bound to the > CertificateRequest and as a required field. > > On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 8:35 PM Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> David, >> >> If we're changing this structure of CertificateRequest, I have two >> suggestions. >> >> 1) Move DistinguishedName out of the structure and define it as a >> TLS-style extension. It's not a required field. >> 2) Remove SignatureScheme from structure, and instead change the behavior >> of the the "signature_algorithms" extension to include all server-supported >> SignatureSchemes in the ServerHello in descending order of preference. >> >> This will result in a much more compact message structure that can easily >> be re-purposed for post-handshake server auth and other optional extensions >> to TLS 1.3: >> >> struct { >> opaque certificate_request_context<1..2^8-1>; >> CertificateRequestExtension certificate_extensions<0..2^16-1>; >> } CertificateRequest; >> >> >> Nick >> >> >> On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 6:26 PM David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> >> wrote: >> >>> On Tue, Sep 6, 2016 at 1:03 PM Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> > But it's OID-specific how the matching works, isn't it? >>>> Correct, and initially we define matching for KU and EKU. These are the >>>> OIDs I've got the most customer requests for. I expect that we will want to >>>> define matching rules for other OIDs over time, in separate specs. This new >>>> proposal allows multiple sets of matching rules for each OID, which >>>> certainly increases flexibility. >>>> >>>> David, do you care enough to write your proposal down as a PR, so that >>>> we can discuss the specifics? >>>> >>> >>> Apologies for the delay. Been a busy few weeks. This is roughly what I >>> was thinking: >>> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/656 >>> >>> What do you think? >>> >>> Again, I don't actually care about this, so if you and others who would >>> use this mechanism prefer it as it is, I have no qualms. This is a "pull >>> suggestion", not a "pull request". :-) >>> >>> David >>> >>> >>>> Thanks, >>>> >>>> Andrei >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: Anders Rundgren [mailto:anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com] >>>> Sent: Tuesday, September 6, 2016 8:36 AM >>>> To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>; David Benjamin < >>>> davidben@chromium.org>; Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>; >>>> Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>; tls@ietf.org >>>> Subject: Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding >>>> >>>> On 2016-09-06 16:15, Peter Gutmann wrote: >>>> > David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> writes: >>>> > >>>> >> Either way I imagine our stack will just keep on ignoring it, so I >>>> >> don't feel about this all too strongly. But the topic came up so I >>>> >> thought I'd suggest this. >>>> > >>>> > I ignore it too. Client certs are so rare, and so painful to deploy, >>>> > that I'm not going to make things harder on users by adding complex >>>> > and opaque filtering to prevent them from working. My approach is to >>>> > specify as few constraints as possible, the client submits whatever >>>> > certificate it has, and it's then decided based on a whitelist for >>>> > which the server can very clearly report "not on the whitelist" when >>>> > it rejects it. The design seems to be based on the idea that each >>>> > client has a smorgasbord of certs and the server can specify in >>>> > precise detail in advance which one it wants, when in reality each >>>> > client has approximately zero certs, and the few that do have one >>>> just want the one they've got to work. >>>> >>>> May I add some nuances here? >>>> >>>> Client-certificates are *extensively* used for secure box-to-box >>>> communication. >>>> Existing selection methods suffice (there's usually none on the client >>>> side). >>>> >>>> Client-certificates for user authentication on the Web through HTTPS is >>>> a small and diminishing activity. The decision by the browser vendors >>>> dropping support for on-line enrollment is likely to further limit this use >>>> case which make improvements in selection/filtering pretty uninteresting. >>>> >>>> Client-certificates for user authentication on the Web through through >>>> proprietary ("FIDO like") application level protocols is fairly big. Half >>>> of the Swedish population use such a scheme for e-government and bank >>>> access. It uses an ugly (and non-secure) OOB-method to make it "Web >>>> compatible". This use-case is (of course) not of an issue for the TLS WG >>>> but may be of some interest for people currently using client certificates >>>> for Web authentication. >>>> >>>> Anders >>>> >>>> >>>> > >>>> > Peter. >>>> > _______________________________________________ >>>> > TLS mailing list >>>> > TLS@ietf.org >>>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >>>> > >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>> TLS mailing list >>> TLS@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >>> >>
- [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding David Benjamin
- Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding David Benjamin
- Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding Andrei Popov
- Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding David Benjamin
- Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding Andrei Popov
- Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding Geoffrey Keating
- Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding Andrei Popov
- Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding David Benjamin
- Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding Andrei Popov
- Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding Nick Sullivan
- Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding David Benjamin
- Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding Nick Sullivan
- Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] CertficateRequest extension encoding Martin Rex