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Re: [TLS] #445: Enhanced New Session Ticket

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Thu, 28 April 2016 21:04 UTC

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Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2016 07:03:59 +1000
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] #445: Enhanced New Session Ticket
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On 29 April 2016 at 06:43, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>> - You might want to specify that allow_dhe_resumption doesn't
>>   change key exchange, only authentication (so DHE_CERT becomes
>>   DHE_PSK and ECDHE_CERT becomes ECDHE_PSK).
>
>
> I'm not sure I follow. It changes key exchange. If we want to have
> a resumption mode that has the server sign, we'll need a different
> indicator here.


There is a separate issue that would have the client able to request
that the server provide a certificate/certificateverify in resumption
handshakes.  For that, we might add a allow_cert_resumption flag.  But
we would do that separately.

(Regarding that, if we use cached-info on that resumption, which is
probably a good idea overall, then that extension will differ between
handshakes.)

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