Re: [TLS] Why TLSA RR and not CERT RR?

[Robert Moskowitz <[e-mail]>]

Viktor,

One thing I left off is that it is possible that 
draft-moskowitz-drip-nrid-c2 will be a major use case for DANCE as I 
have discussed on the DANCE list.

The DRIP chairs want to wrap up current work before we tackle phase 2, 
but I have external players that want PoC for secure nrid NOW. So I keep 
working on all drafts in parallel.

Bob

On 6/26/22 16:55, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> On Sun, Jun 26, 2022 at 04:29:38PM -0400, Robert Moskowitz wrote:
>
>> I will use them in draft-ietf-drip-registries for our X.509 certs and
>> our 'custom' attestation certs (private OID will be needed). And then
>> the powers-that-be can sort it out as we move forward.
> Why do the certificates need to be delivered via DNS?  Are TLS or DTLS
> not suitable as protocols between the subject and relying party?
>
> What is the management model for these certificates?  How will key
> rollover at the subject be coördinated with changes in the DNS?
>
> TLSA records are flexible in that they can specify trust-anchor keys or
> certificates (typically their digests) as well as EE keys or
> certificates.  Multiple TLSA records can be published at the same RRset,
> and rollover is facilitated by requiring only one to match.
>
> The need to tightly synchronise regular certificate rollovers with DNS
> changes can be avoided by keeping EE keys stable, or publishing a stable
> issuer trust-anchor key.  Alternatively, one can pre-publish future
> EE public keys and then use that key in a later certificate rollover
> if observed in DNS for a sufficient number of TTLs, or else renew the
> certificate with the extant key.
>
> So there are well-understood (if not yet universally practiced)
> operational practices that enable robust deployments of DANE TLSA.
>
> Is there something similar for the proposed use of CERT?  Is publication
> of (often multi-kilobyte) full certificates in DNS a good idea?
>