Re: [TLS] Fixing TLS

Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com> Tue, 12 January 2016 20:18 UTC

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From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 12:18:04 -0800
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To: Bill Cox <waywardgeek@google.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fixing TLS
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On Tue, Jan 12, 2016 at 12:12 PM, Bill Cox <waywardgeek@google.com>; wrote:

> I wish that were the plan (to upgrade QUIC crypto and eventually make that
> the new crypto platform).  If I am not mistaken, QUICK crypto is going to
> be archived, TLS 1.3 will replace the crypto code, and QUIC will remain the
> transport layer.  So, maybe long-term you folks could do a clean-slate TLS
> 2.0?  That would would be awesome, IMO.
>

Have you looked at OPTLS? It provides a clean "core" for TLS, and also
supports Diffie-Hellman authentication ala Trevor Perrin's protocol Noise.

If TLS 1.3 can shed the cruft, OPTLS seems like a nice direction to go for
"TLS 2.0"

-- 
Tony Arcieri