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Re: [TLS] Expanded alert codes. [Was Re: Genart last call review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24]

Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Sun, 01 April 2018 08:14 UTC

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Ion Larranaga Azcue <ilarra@s21sec.com>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
CC: IETF discussion list <ietf@ietf.org>, General Area Review Team <gen-art@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-tls-tls13.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-tls-tls13.all@ietf.org>, "Dale R. Worley" <worley@ariadne.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Expanded alert codes. [Was Re: Genart last call review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24]
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Date: Sun, 01 Apr 2018 08:14:12 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Expanded alert codes. [Was Re: Genart last call review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24]
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Ion Larranaga Azcue <ilarra@s21sec.com> writes:

>And for the malicious user that, knowing the server is currently in debug
>mode and returning extended errors, can more easily perform attacks on it...

If there's someone on the Internet who can scan every TLS server on the planet
once a minute to see a brief debug window open up, and then perform something
like a million-message-attack using a single debug message, then they're kinda
wasting their abilities in attacking TLS servers...

Peter.

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