Re: [TLS] Murray Kucherawy's No Objection on draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-guidance-04: (with COMMENT)
Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Wed, 22 December 2021 05:48 UTC
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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2021 00:48:09 -0500
Cc: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-guidance@ietf.org, tls-chairs@ietf.org, IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
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To: Murray Kucherawy <superuser@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Murray Kucherawy's No Objection on draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-guidance-04: (with COMMENT)
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> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > COMMENT: > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Thanks to Martin Thomson for his ARTART review. > > A stylistic point: The Abstract is made up of five sentences all of which start > "This document". It's a bit of a rigid read. Maybe something like this? > > This document provides usage guidance for external Pre-Shared Keys > (PSKs) in Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 as defined in RFC 8446. > It lists TLS security properties provided by PSKs under > certain assumptions, and then demonstrates how violations of these > assumptions lead to attacks. It also discusses PSK use cases > and provisioning processes. Advice for > applications to help meet these assumptions is provided. Finally, > it lists the privacy and security properties that are not provided by > TLS 1.3 when external PSKs are used. > Thanks. I swapped two of your sentence so that the two sentences about assumptions are one after the other. > Section 4.1 contains this, which I can't quite parse: > > To illustrate the rerouting attack, consider the group of peers who > know the PSK be A, B, and C. > > Should there be a "to" after "PSK"? I suggest: To illustrate the rerouting attack, consider three peers, A, B, and C, who all know the PSK. The attack proceeds as follows: > In Section 8: > > Each endpoint SHOULD know the identifier of the other endpoint with > which its wants to connect and SHOULD compare it with the other > > s/its/it/ Fixed. Russ
- [TLS] Murray Kucherawy's No Objection on draft-ie… Murray Kucherawy via Datatracker
- Re: [TLS] Murray Kucherawy's No Objection on draf… Russ Housley