Re: [TLS] The case for a single stream of data
Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> Thu, 11 May 2017 08:52 UTC
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Date: Thu, 11 May 2017 11:52:18 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
Cc: Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] The case for a single stream of data
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On Thu, May 11, 2017 at 12:00:17AM -0500, Benjamin Kaduk wrote: > > First off, it seems somewhat self-evident that if we guarantee 0-RTT > non-replay, then of course it makes sense to just concatenate the > streams. That is, if 0-RTT data is not replayable, there's not much > special about it to merit separating it off from normal application > data. This isn't quite exactly true because of the DKG attack, but it > may be close enough to not matter. > > However, I'm still not convinced that requiring strong 0-RTT non-replay > is feasible/the right thing to do. So, I do not consider the question > of single stream vs. block-of-early-data + 1-RTT stream to be settled. There are deeper problems than that: - Strict HTTP clients can't allow autoreplay if 0-RTT contains a POST (and any HTTP client that isn't strict is a lost cause anyway). - Ensuring that there is no race causing possible data corruption if the server rejects 0-RTT. - Concatenation seems to play poorly with 0-RTT exporters (which start to seem like an attractive nuisance...). Also, turns out that unordered replay is just fundamential. So any _existing_ systems that don't handle unordered replay can be broken, and there isn't anything TLS can do about that. Which leaves the "loads of replays" problem from lack of strong 0-RTT replay protection. -Ilari
- [TLS] The case for a single stream of data Colm MacCárthaigh
- Re: [TLS] The case for a single stream of data Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] The case for a single stream of data Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] The case for a single stream of data Kyle Rose
- Re: [TLS] The case for a single stream of data Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] The case for a single stream of data Kyle Rose
- Re: [TLS] The case for a single stream of data Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] The case for a single stream of data Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] The case for a single stream of data Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] The case for a single stream of data Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] The case for a single stream of data Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] The case for a single stream of data Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] The case for a single stream of data Colm MacCárthaigh
- Re: [TLS] The case for a single stream of data Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] The case for a single stream of data Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] The case for a single stream of data Andrei Popov
- Re: [TLS] The case for a single stream of data Roland Zink
- Re: [TLS] The case for a single stream of data Colm MacCárthaigh
- Re: [TLS] The case for a single stream of data Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] The case for a single stream of data Colm MacCárthaigh
- Re: [TLS] The case for a single stream of data Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] The case for a single stream of data Colm MacCárthaigh
- Re: [TLS] The case for a single stream of data Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] The case for a single stream of data Ilari Liusvaara