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Re: [TLS] Next steps for draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation

David-Sarah Hopwood <david-sarah@jacaranda.org> Mon, 30 November 2009 23:24 UTC

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Sender: David-Sarah Hopwood <djhopwood@googlemail.com>
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Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2009 23:23:50 +0000
From: David-Sarah Hopwood <david-sarah@jacaranda.org>
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References: <808FD6E27AD4884E94820BC333B2DB774F3118C3CA@NOK-EUMSG-01.mgdnok.nokia.com> <20091130170745.GH773@Sun.COM>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Next steps for draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation
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Nicolas Williams wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 27, 2009 at 11:26:34PM +0100, Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com wrote:
>> <wearing Area Director hat>
>>
>> I have asked the secretariat to start IETF Last Call for
>> draft-rescorla-tls-renegotiation-01.
>>
>> I've gone through the list archives for the past month, and it seems a
>> large majority of the WG members support the overall approach in this
>> draft (with a small, but very vocal, minority preferring a totally
>> extension-less approach to signalling).
> 
> I don't think that's a fair nor complete characterization of the current
> differences of opinion.  A more complete and correct characterization
> might be:
> 
>  - The RI proposal has a fail-unsafe requirement that peers check the
>    contents of the extensions sent.
> 
>    NOTE: A fix for this wouldn't require an extension-less signalling
>          solution.
> 
>    [IMO: This is serious objection that goes beyond protocol design
>          aesthetics or ease of retrofitting for SSLv3.  I think we can
> 	 live without a fix for this problem, but I'd much rather have a
> 	 fail-safe solution.]
> 
>  - There seems to be a desire, among some, for a signalling solution
>    that is somehow easier to retrofit for SSLv3 implementations.  This
>    couldn't be an extension-less scheme, since some bits are needed to
>    signal the use of the fix in the client's initial hello, but it might
>    avoid the use of server hello extensions.
> 
>    [IMO: This is a concern that we can safely ignore.]

I agree completely with both your characterization of the situation,
and statements of opinion.

-- 
David-Sarah Hopwood  ⚥  http://davidsarah.livejournal.com

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