Re: [TLS] Consensus Call for draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-00.txt

Geoffery,

The current version of this draft is:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-01
It does no longer have the sections you refer to.

/Stefan

On 09-11-29 4:27 AM, "Geoffrey Keating" <geoffk@apple.com> wrote:

> Apple supports this draft, with the following modification:
> 
> The draft does not address the security issue for existing clients unless it
> requires that renegotiation occur only when the extension is present.  I
> suggest strengthening the language in 4.2 to read
> 
> To prevent such attacks, servers MUST NOT allow clients who do not offer the
> "renegotiation_info" extension to complete a renegotiation.  If the client
> initiated the renegotiation the server SHOULD respond to such requests with a
> "no_renegotiation" alert [RFC 5246 requires this alert to be at the "warning"
> level.]  If the server initiated the renegotiation the fatal
> "handshake_failure" alert is appropriate.
> 
> and delete the sentence 'Servers SHOULD follow this behaviour'.
> 
> With this modification, section 4.1.1 is redundant and may be deleted.  It is
> also possible to delete section 4.3 as with this modification, if the client
> is convinced to drop the extension, either servers support the draft and will
> refuse to renegotiate without the extension and are still secure, or don't
> support the draft and will ignore the extension, and so would be insecure
> anyway.
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls