Re: [TLS] Deprecating TLS 1.0, 1.1 and SHA1 signature algorithms

Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Mon, 11 January 2016 23:23 UTC

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>, Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Deprecating TLS 1.0, 1.1 and SHA1 signature algorithms
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Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 23:23:20 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Deprecating TLS 1.0, 1.1 and SHA1 signature algorithms
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David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>; writes:

>In terms of getting rid of TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 altogether, we're seeing
>around 3% of connections using TLS 1.0 or TLS 1.1. That's quite high, and it's
>likely that enterprise deployments are much worse.

Embedded is even worse.  I don't have any figures since it's mostly invisible
stuff, but anecdotally I'd say the bell-curve is centered around TLS 1.0/1.1.

Peter.