Re: [TLS] Update on TLS 1.3 Middlebox Issues

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Sun, 08 October 2017 22:23 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Sun, 8 Oct 2017 15:22:33 -0700
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To: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
Cc: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>, Transport Layer Surveillance WG <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Update on TLS 1.3 Middlebox Issues
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You seem to be responding to some other thread. As both Adam Langley and I
mentioned, none of the changes that anyone is investigating for reducing
middlebox-induced breakage affect the cryptographic properties of TLS.

-Ekr


On Sun, Oct 8, 2017 at 2:42 PM, Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>; wrote:

> there are a lot of us lurkers out here a bit horrified watching this wg
> go off the rails.
>
> it would help if vendors of devices which break privacy would stop
> speaking for 'datacenters' and let datacenters speak for themselves.  i
> have not seen any doing so.  my $dayjob has >10 medium sized datacenters
> serving everything from banks to telcos to scaled cloud services.  i can
> not find folk in our datacenter groups who see a need to break e2e
> encryption.
>
> if the interception proposals ensured that user is notified and able to
> prevent session interception, then i would believe this.  but if they do
> not, then let's face it, this is all about selling surveillance gear to
> snooping enterprises and repressive regiemes where people with guns take
> you away at 3am because your session was decoded.
>
> can we please provide real end to end privacy or call this wg something
> else?
>
> randy
>
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