Re: [TLS] Finished stuffing/PSK Binders

[Hugo Krawczyk <[e-mail]>]

On Fri, Oct 7, 2016 at 1:08 PM, Eric Rescorla <[e-mail]> wrote:

>
>
> On Fri, Oct 7, 2016 at 10:03 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <[e-mail]
> > wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Oct 07, 2016 at 09:35:40AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>> > On Fri, Oct 7, 2016 at 8:26 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <
>> [e-mail]>
>> > wrote:
>> >
>> > > On Fri, Oct 07, 2016 at 08:01:43AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>> > > > 4. I've taken a suggestion from David Benjamin to move the
>> negotiation
>> > > > of the PSK key exchange parameters out of the PSK itself and into a
>> > > > separate message. This cleans things up and also lets us drop the
>> > > > currently non-useful auth_mode parameter.
>> > >
>> > > Eeh... From the text, it seems to currently require the kex modes
>> > > extension if PSK extension is present. Which seems worse than useless
>> > > if the meaning is to get rid of the kex mode parameter from PSK
>> > > extension (since you will have the value anyway, but need to dig it
>> > > from another extension... Blech).
>> >
>> > I guess this is a matter of taste, but what convinced me was that:
>> >
>> > 1. It put all the logic on the server side.
>> > 2. It removed the auth mod parameter.
>> >
>> > Maybe david can say more.
>>
>> I mean if server is to accept PSK, it must now go fishing for another
>> extension, check that it is present and pay attention to values there.
>> As opposed to having the data in where it is needed.
>>
>
> This is a reasonable argument (and the reason I stuffed the binder here).
> However, David's argument was that this applied to *all* PSKs even new
> ones.
>
>
> -Ekr
>
> > > Also, didn't notice what prevents pathology like this (I presume this
>> > > is not allowed):
>> > >
>> > > (Assume PSK with 0RTT allowed, using AES-128-GCM-SHA256)
>> > >
>> > > ClientHello[Ciphers=CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256, EarlyDataIndication]
>> --->
>> > > [0-RTT data, encrypted using AES-128-GCM-SHA256]
>> > > <-- ServerHello[Cipher=CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256]
>> > > <-- EncryptedExtensions[EarlyDataIndication]
>> > >
>> > > Note the record protection algorithm mismatch.
>> > >
>> >
>> > Yes, this is forbidden by the combination of:
>> >
>> > "The parameters for the 0-RTT data (symmetric cipher suite,
>> > ALPN, etc.) are the same as those which were negotiated in the
>> connection
>> > which established the PSK.  The PSK used to encrypt the early data
>> > MUST be the first PSK listed in the client's "pre_shared_key"
>> extension."
>> > (though I think I just recently added cipher suite).
>> >
>> > and:
>> > "Any ticket MUST only be resumed with a cipher suite that is identical
>> > to that negotiated connection where the ticket was established."
>>
>> If 0-RTT is used with manually provisioned PSKs (might not be allowed
>> currently, but might be allowed soon), does that still hold?
>>
>> Also, I think it is problematic that externally provisioned PSKs can
>> be used with any protection with given prf-hash, while NST-provisioned
>> PSKs can only be used with one protection and prf-hash.
>>
>> 0-RTT requirements are separate matter, since those would apply to all.
>>
>> The original purpose of resumption-as-PSK was AFAIK to unify the two
>> mechanisms to simplify things. Therefore those two should be as similar
>> as possible.
>>
>> >
>> > Also, to straightforwardly prove that collision resistance of HKDF and
>> > > HMAC (as used) follows from collision resistance of the underlying
>> hash
>> > > function, yon need to take the output to be at least the hash output
>> > > size. As otherwise it is not guaranteed that any collision in HKDF or
>> > > HMAC can be reduced into collision of the underlying hash.
>> > >
>> >
>> > Right. I have some text here but please feel free to suggest more.
>>
>> Yes, but the text says 256 bit output is enough. One isn't guaranteed
>> to be able to reduce such collision to collision of >256 bit hash.
>>
>> (In fact, if the hash is e.g. 384 bit, 256-bit collisions are extremely
>> unlikely to reduce).
>>
>
> Right. I can update.
>


​
​I think that allowing truncation (e.g. for SHA-512) with at least 256-bit
output should be fine too without forcing implementations to work with,
say, 512-bit keys.
While I agree that we don't have generic reductions from collision
resistance of a hash function to its truncations, such (long enough)
truncations are believed to inherit collision resistance. For example,
SHA-512 is "officially" allowed to be truncated and it is the way SHA-384
is defined. Also, a collision on a 256-bit truncated output would be a
MAJOR weakness for any hash function, in particular "breaking" the
treatment of the function as a random oracle (such weakness must lead to
abandoning that hash function).

What do cryptanalysts think?

Hugo
​
 ​


>
> -Ekr
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>> -Ilari
>>
>
>
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