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Re: [TLS] Universal PSKs

Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com> Mon, 18 June 2018 09:47 UTC

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From: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2018 11:47:25 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Universal PSKs
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On Fri, 2018-06-15 at 14:24 +0000, Salz, Rich wrote:
> >    that's not workable.
> 
>   
> It's not great, however
>   
> >    the reason why implementations chose to use old API to provision
> > TLS 1.3 PSKs 
> 
>     was to make the upgrade process as smooth as possible, disabling
> TLS 1.3 is 
>     quite antithetical to that
>   
> Disabling TLS 1.3 for those using 1.2 PSK's is unlikely to affect
> most uses, and seems the only way forward.
> 
> Do you have an alternative solution?

TLS 1.3 provides a solution. These secrets under TLS1.3 are restricted
to using the SHA256 PRF. That's how we have implemented it in gnutls.

regards,
Nikos

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