Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Tue, 20 December 2016 14:48 UTC

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead
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> This is the working group last call for the "ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM CSs for TLS” draft

I am curious about the choice of hash function for TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8_SHA256.  All of the other AES-256 ciphersuites defined in this document that use SHA-384.  Why does the one with a truncated authentication tag use SHA-256?

The Security Consideration includes:

   Use of Pre-Shared Keys of limited entropy (for example, a PSK that is
   relatively short, or was chosen by a human and thus may contain less
   entropy than its length would imply) may allow an active attacker to
   perform a brute-force attack where the attacker attempts to connect
   to the server and tries different keys.

Given the mention of passwords, it seems that dictionary attacks should also be mentioned.

Russ