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Re: [TLS] Call for acceptance on multi-stapling

Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> Thu, 19 April 2012 21:52 UTC

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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: marsh@extendedsubset.com
Date: Thu, 19 Apr 2012 23:52:39 +0200
In-Reply-To: <4F8FFCF5.9030202@extendedsubset.com> from "Marsh Ray" at Apr 19, 12 06:54:29 am
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Cc: tls@ietf.org, aerowolf@gmail.com, paul.hoffman@vpnc.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Call for acceptance on multi-stapling
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Marsh Ray wrote:
> 
> I wonder why they didn't propose an extension to negotiate the use of
> False Start. Surely that would fix the server intolerance problem.

+1

> 
> Perhaps they didn't think the WG would adopt it and/or the servers would
> deploy support for it soon enough?
> 
> I would love to support a revised version of the proposal
> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-bmoeller-tls-falsestart-00.txt
> that negotiated via a TLS extension.

+1, but I do not understand what kind of problem the Google proposal
has with the RSA key exchange method.  The functionality of FalseStart
and the RSA key exchange method are completely orthogonal (i.e. unrelated).

-Martin

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