[TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-yusef-tls-pqt-dual-certs-02.txt

John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com> Wed, 15 July 2026 16:51 UTC

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From: John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com>
To: Bas Westerbaan <bas=40cloudflare.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, Deirdre Connolly <durumcrustulum@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-yusef-tls-pqt-dual-certs-02.txt
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Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 16:51:47 +0000
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Subject: [TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-yusef-tls-pqt-dual-certs-02.txt
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Hi,

I have not read draft-yusef-tls-pqt-dual-certs in enough detail and I assume that the downgrade question is about WebPKI, which I do not use.

My strong preference is standalone SLH-DSA and ML-DSA, including MTC. For some non-TLS use cases where our suppliers could not deliver SLH-DSA in time, we implemented a non-composite ML-DSA + Ed448 solution.

In our environment, downgrade protection is achieved operationally. We first update all nodes to support ML-DSA + Ed448 and then update the security policy to require ML-DSA + Ed448, thereby eliminating fallback to classical-only authentication. We generally try to avoid implementing cryptographic primitives or protocol mechanisms ourselves. However, for hybrid signatures we made an exception, as two suppliers proposed hybrid signature implementations that were vulnerable to downgrade attacks.

Cheers,
John Preuß Mattsson

From: Bas Westerbaan <bas=40cloudflare.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Date: Wednesday, 15 July 2026 at 18:30
To: Deirdre Connolly <durumcrustulum@gmail.com>
Cc: John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com>; Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) <sfluhrer@cisco.com>;
<tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-yusef-tls-pqt-dual-certs-02.txt

And how to deal with downgrades in that case?

On Wed, Jul 15, 2026 at 6:29 PM Deirdre Connolly <durumcrustulum@gmail.com<mailto:durumcrustulum@gmail.com>> wrote:
> If hybrid signatures are used, we strongly prefer non-composite hybrids, as they simplify the PKI and provide greater flexibility.

Like dual?

On Wed, Jul 15, 2026, 7:22 AM John Mattsson <john.mattsson=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>> wrote:
>However, I don't believe that SLH-DSA would be considered a practical solution for TLS negotiation.

I would disagree. Ericsson’s conclusion is that SLH-DSA is practical for all of our TLS, DTLS, and QUIC telecom use cases.

Our conclusion is also that we prefer the modest performance overhead of standalone SLH-DSA over the significant PKI complexity introduced by hybrid signatures. If hybrid signatures are used, we strongly prefer non-composite hybrids, as they simplify the PKI and provide greater flexibility.

Cheers,
John Preuß Mattsson

From: Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) <sfluhrer=40cisco.com@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:40cisco.com@dmarc.ietf.org>>
Date: Wednesday, 15 July 2026 at 12:58
To: John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com<mailto:john.mattsson@ericsson.com>>; ilariliusvaara@welho.com<mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com> <ilariliusvaara@welho.com<mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com>>;
<tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-yusef-tls-pqt-dual-certs-02.txt

You are, of course, correct.

However, I don't believe that SLH-DSA would be considered a practical solution for TLS negotiation.

________________________________
From: John Mattsson <john.mattsson=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>>
Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2026 1:29 AM
To: Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) <sfluhrer@cisco.com<mailto:sfluhrer@cisco.com>>; ilariliusvaara@welho.com<mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com> <ilariliusvaara@welho.com<mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com>>; <tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>> <tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-yusef-tls-pqt-dual-certs-02.txt

>And the Europeans (or, at least their governments) have indicated that it is a requirement for their security profiles.

No, all European government I know of approve standalone SLH-DSA.

Cheers,
John Preuß Mattsson

From: Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) <sfluhrer=40cisco.com@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:40cisco.com@dmarc.ietf.org>>
Date: Tuesday, 14 July 2026 at 22:55
To: ilariliusvaara@welho.com<mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com> <ilariliusvaara@welho.com<mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com>>;
<tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>>
Subject: [TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-yusef-tls-pqt-dual-certs-02.txt



> -----Original Message-----
> From: ilariliusvaara@welho.com<mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com> <ilariliusvaara@welho.com<mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com>>
> Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2026 4:12 PM
> To: <tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>> <tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>>
> Subject: [TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-yusef-tls-pqt-dual-
> certs-02.txt
>
> On Tue, Jul 14, 2026 at 06:01:55PM +0000, Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) wrote:
> > Forgive my curiosity, but could you please expand on that?
> >
> > We designed the composite certificates/signatures to act like "just
> > another signature algorithm" (if you don't peek into the innards and I
> > don't know why anything other than the low level crypto would need
> > to).
>
> Introducing a new algorithm requires creating a new line of certificates, and
> most webservers just do not support any sane way of automatically doing that.
>
> And even if webserver does support it, there are all manner of nasty edge cases
> making life hard for the ACME client.

If introducing a new algorithm into ACME is an issue, I believe that should be fixed - not only for hybrid, but postquantum in general.  We can't expect that we can rely on RSA, ECDSA and EdDSA for that many more years.  We don't know when q-day will happen, but I've seen estimates from 2029 to "early 30's".   Those guesses are from companies working on Quantum Computing, and so might reflect either marketing hype or overoptimistic hope, but I don't know if we want to make that a security assumption.

>
>
> > My personal opinion: I see the need for both pure and hybrid
> > authentication. However, the hybrid authentication needn't be
> > composite certificates - dual (aka parallel) certificates would
> > address the need just as well.
>
> My opinion is that hybrid authentication should be left to environments with
> security profile standard specifying it.

And the Europeans (or, at least their governments) have indicated that it is a requirement for their security profiles.  Even if the situations that ACME supports need not consider those requirements, private CAs certainly would have to and those would be in scope for TLS.

>
> And while dual certificates are in theory simple (do both independently with
> intersected algorithm list), in practice this causes major issues with APIs (since
> there are now two EEs).

Is EE == Encrypted Extension?  If that's the correct acronym expansion, I don't see why we couldn't just use one.  On the other hand, I do acknowledge that it would make things more difficult for the TLS protocol level - I'll let the people that actually work on that level to talk about how difficult it is (and if you're one of those guys, I would bow to your superior knowledge).

>
> With composite certificates, the combinatorial explosion occurs directly in
> certificates, which is the absolutely worst place to have that in.

The obvious way to address that is to not specify every combination, but only one (or a handful).  There have been a huge number of elliptic curves published, however we appear to be quite happy with using a few.

>
>
> > ________________________________
> > From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com<mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com>>
> > Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2026 1:44 PM
> > To: <tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>> <tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>>
> > Subject: [TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for
> > draft-yusef-tls-pqt-dual-certs-02.txt
> >
> > As an operator, I can say that issuing composite certificate is a big
> > deal, even with automation like ACME. Because it involves actions that
> > can not be feasibly automated.
>
>
>
>
> -Ilari
>
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