Re: [TLS] TLS or HTTP issue?

Marsh Ray <> Fri, 06 November 2009 18:02 UTC

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Date: Fri, 06 Nov 2009 12:02:52 -0600
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS or HTTP issue?
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Nathaniel W Filardo wrote:
> Forgive me if I'm mistaken, but as far as I understand (one of) the
> attack(s), it relies on an application protocol (e.g. HTTP) request being
> 'fragmented' across the renegotiation (thus the need for, in HTTP, the
> attacker-provided X-Swallow-This: header to absorb the client's GET)...

I expect there will be others (far more skilled than I in the art of
HTTP abuse) improving on that in the coming days. Steve and I just
developed a few examples to demonstrate the severity of the problem.

This capability has been characterized as a "blind plaintext prefix
injection attack". I don't think many protocols have been designed to be
resilient against that kind of thing, those that are not vulnerable are
that way by accident. HTTP is particularly susceptible, but I'm sure
many more protocols will be found to be exploitable.

- Marsh