Re: [TLS] network-based security solution use cases

On Tue, Nov 7, 2017 at 4:23 PM, Nancy Cam-Winget (ncamwing)
<ncamwing@cisco.com> wrote:
> Hi Stephen,
> Please see below:
>
> On 11/7/17, 4:08 PM, "Stephen Farrell" <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>
>
>     Hiya,
>
>     On 07/11/17 23:53, Nancy Cam-Winget (ncamwing) wrote:
>     > Hi Stephen, Adding to Flemming’s comment,  finding “exact quotes”
>     > will be difficult
>
>     I'm sorry but when making a claim that such and such a regulation
>     *requires* breaking TLS then you really do need to be that precise.
> [NCW] In TLS 1.2, not sure why you state *requires* as there is the visibility afforded to
> at least allow for the identity disclosure to enable white or blacklist for example.
>
>     > as their intent is really not to break things but
>     > rather want to ensure that inspection and oversight is available to
>     > affect guards/protections within an (enterprise/data center)
>     > infrastructure.   That said, PCI and other regulations will have a
>     > lot of documents that one has to go through….one that kind-of calls
>     > explicitly to the use of packet inspection, firewalling and such is
>     > in:
>     >
>     > https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/SAQ_D_v3_Merchant.pdf
>
>     The first mention of TLS there talks about protecting administrator
>     passwords via TLS. That totally argues against deployment of any kind
>     of MitM infrastructure.
> [NCW] Agreed, they also state in ensuring that the newest TLS version where
> possible is used.  BUT, they also expect monitoring and troubleshooting.
>
>     >
>     > It is an assessment questionnaire for vendors to evaluate their
>     > compliance, the requirements speak to securing the network and
>     > systems including firewalls, DMZs and the ability to do packet
>     > inspection.
>
>     Please point me at the specific text. Given you added PCI-DSS to
>     your document I would assume you did the work already. If not,
>     that's a bit odd.
> [NCW] From the link above, you can look at requirements in 1.3,
> also Requirement 10 details the need to monitor and provide audit trails
> for network resources and cardholder data.

None of the questions in requirement 10 require middlebox interception.
>
>     S.
>
>
>     >
>     > Thanks, Nancy
>     >
>     > On 11/7/17, 3:27 PM, "Flemming Andreasen (fandreas)"
>     > <fandreas@cisco.com> wrote:
>     >
>     > Thanks for taking an initial look at the document Stephen - please
>     > see below for responses so far
>     >
>     > On 11/7/17 4:13 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>     >> Hiya,
>     >>
>     >> On 07/11/17 02:48, Flemming Andreasen wrote:
>     >>> We didn't draw any particular line, but the use case scenarios
>     >>> that we tried to highlight are those related to overall security
>     >>> and regulatory requirements (including public sector)
>     >> I had a quick look at the draft (will try read properly en-route
>     >> to ietf-100) and I followed the reference to [1] but that only lead
>     >> to a forest of documents in which I didn't find any reference to
>     >> breaking TLS so far at least. Can you provide an explicit pointer
>     >> to the exact document on which that claim is based?
>     > For NERC, you can look under  "(CIP) Critital Infrastructure
>     > Protection". CIP-005-5 for example covers the electronic security
>     > perimeter, which has a couple of relevant requirements and associated
>     > text:
>     >
>     > http://www.nerc.com/_layouts/PrintStandard.aspx?standardnumber=CIP-005-5&title=Cyber%20Security%20-%20Electronic%20Security%20Perimeter(s)&jurisdiction=United%20States
>     >
>     >
>     >
>     > To be clear though, the document does not specifically call out
>     > breaking TLS, but it does clearly call out the need to detect
>     > malicious inbound and outbound communications by leveraging an
>     > "Electronic Access Point" (e.g. IDS/IPS) to enforce the Electronic
>     > Security Perimeter.
>     >> I'd also claim that your reference to PCI-DSS is misleading, as
>     >> that same spec also explicitly calls for there to be good key
>     >> management specifically including minimising the number of copies
>     >> of keys, so at most, one might be able to claim that PCI-DSS is ok
>     >> with people who break TLS in a nod-and-a-wink manner. But if you do
>     >> have a real quote from PCI-DSS that calls for breaking TLS then
>     >> please do also send that (it's been asked for a bunch of times
>     >> without any answer being provided so far).
>     >
>     > I will need to look more closely for such a quote - if anybody else
>     > knows of one, please chime in as well.
>     >
>     > Thanks
>     >
>     > -- Flemming
>     >
>     >
>     >> Thanks, S.
>     >>
>     >>
>     >> [1]
>     >> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-camwinget-tls-use-cases-00.html#ref-NERCCIP
>     >
>     >>
>     >
>     >
>     >
>     >
>
>
>
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