[TLS] Drop "1.x" from future TLS version names?

Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com> Mon, 20 August 2018 15:28 UTC

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From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Aug 2018 08:28:07 -0700
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Subject: [TLS] Drop "1.x" from future TLS version names?
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Apologies if the last thing people want to talk about right now is the next
version of TLS.

There was much discussion about bumping TLS 1.3's version number to "TLS 4"
or thereabouts (so as to be higher than "SSLv3"). The ship has sailed on
that and it is "TLS 1.3".

I think there was widespread agreement that TLS 1.3 represented something a
bit more substantial than a minor version bump, and a desire to have a TLS
version number bigger than the SSL version number lest people get confused
and deploy SSLv3 instead of TLS 1.3.

Modest proposal: TLS 1.4 => TLS 4

I bring this up so soon because I think a lot of the pushback regarding
doing this before was due to changing the version so late in the
development cycle.

-- 
Tony Arcieri