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[TLS] Asymmetric TLS

Phil Lello <phil@dunlop-lello.uk> Mon, 04 April 2016 17:24 UTC

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Date: Mon, 04 Apr 2016 18:24:52 +0100
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From: Phil Lello <phil@dunlop-lello.uk>
To: tls <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: [TLS] Asymmetric TLS
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Hi,

I have a use-case for allowing an MITM to monitor traffic, but not
impersonate a server, and to allow MITM signing for replay of
server-responses to support caching.

As far as I'm aware, TLS currently only supports a shared-secret once
session initialisation is complete, so I'd need to extend the protocol to
support asymmetric encryption for the session.

Would there be interest in extending TLS to:
  - allow monitoring-with-consent (based on asymmetric encryption)?
  - allow re-signing from an authorised MITM to support caching?

Best wishes,

Phil Lello

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