Re: [TLS] RC4 Considered Harmful (Was: RC4 deprecation path)

[Alyssa Rowan <[e-mail]>]

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On 23/04/2014 05:09, Watson Ladd wrote:

> At some point RC4 needs to be removed. The question is now, or 
> after someone demonstrates the sort of attack that we have 
> nightmares about. Actually, given the talk about a removal path, 5
> years from now or 3 years after someone demonstrates an attack.

The only correct response to a probably-broken cipher is to turn it
off _right now_ and replace it with something better (TLSv1.2
AES-128-GCM, say).

Unless you're doing SSL/TLS for purely decorative purposes, it is
preferable that insecure endpoints are unreachable or warned about -
and are fixed - than the very real hazard that people will _go back_
and decrypt all of your sensitive traffic.

> One side or the other needs patching, preferably both. End of the 
> day we can't do anything without some actual work getting done on 
> deployed stuff.

I see a draft like this as being the writing on the wall the slowpokes
need to start getting them moving; more importantly, the writing on
the wall that we can show their auditors.

- -- 
/akr
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