Re: [TLS] Strawman on EdDSA/Ed25519 in TLS

Simon Josefsson <> Fri, 29 May 2015 21:14 UTC

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From: Simon Josefsson <>
To: Ilari Liusvaara <>
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Date: Fri, 29 May 2015 23:14:39 +0200
In-Reply-To: <20150520203011.GA25549@LK-Perkele-VII> (Ilari Liusvaara's message of "Wed, 20 May 2015 23:30:11 +0300")
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Strawman on EdDSA/Ed25519 in TLS
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Ilari Liusvaara <> writes:

> On Wed, May 20, 2015 at 07:14:47PM +0200, Simon Josefsson wrote:
>> Support for EdDSA/Ed25519 in TLS has been suggested a couple of times.
>> I have started to work on an I-D to describe more precisely what that
>> would actually mean, and here is an initial strawman document:
>> I'm confident I missed some major pieces of the puzzle, but feedback and
>> review is welcome so the document can be improved into something that
>> can be implemented and interoperate.
> More ciphersuites? The signature algorithm negotiation (extension 13)
> doesn't work in practice?

Yoav suggested reusing the ECDSA ciphersuites with (I assume) a new
extension 13 value for eddsa.

>> One aspect I'm aware of is that there is no OID allocated nor
>> specification of PKIX certificates with EdDSA/Ed25519 public keys.  I'm
>> not sure the above document is the right place for doing that though,
>> and more thinking around this topic is especially appreciated.
> AFAIK, a way to put the key into PKIX SPKI is required for the
> new signature algorithm to be useful.
> And that means OIDs. The curve itself is,
> but AFAIK, there is no OID for the signature primitive.
> I think one can find more expertise about how to put various
> keys into SPKI in the PKIX mailinglist.

I'll try to prepare an email asking for help.

> Reading the PKIX specs, it seems like there are two ways:
> 1) Use algorithm "Unresricted" and use a new point format to
> denote LE edwards points.
> 2) Define new algorithm (OID) for EdDSA, put the curve OID
> as parameter and the LE edwards point as the key.

I prefer 2).  Given that EdDSA is not applicable to arbitrary curves,
you might want to allocate a new algorithm OID for Ed25519 directly with
no parameters.  This will reduce complexity a bit.

Thank you Ilari!