Re: [TLS] Tonight's Encrypted SNI Hangout Session

[Flemming Andreasen <[e-mail]>]

Please see https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-camwinget-tls-use-cases-00.txt 
for some example use case scenarios impacted by encrypted SNI.

As Ekr subsequently pointed out, it would be useful to make a 
distinction between conformant and non-conformant use case scenarios 
(which we plan to do in the next version).

Thanks

-- Flemming



On 11/13/17 8:16 PM, Bret Jordan wrote:
> What I think I am more worried about right now is jumping in to 
> designing a technological solution before we know and understand what 
> is going to break and is a solution going to actually solve the 
> perceived problem(s) or make them worse. Technological changes do not 
> always make things better.
>
> Open Questions:
> 1) Is encrypted SNI the best solution to address the perceived problem(s)?
> 2) Do we fully understand the problems we are trying to solve and 
> understand the best way of solving them?
> 3) Will this make things better or worse for the majority of use-cases?
> 4) Does it incur so much collateral damage that it hurts the average user?
> 5) If we make it client opt-in (which seems like a fundamental 
> requirement), does this single out the client for extra scrutiny by a 
> well funded threat actor or nation state?
>
> Just some food for thought
>
> Bret
>
> Sent from my TI-99/4A
>
> PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050
>
>
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