Re: [TLS] Connection diversion to other subdomains

Marsh Ray <marsh@extendedsubset.com> Fri, 05 November 2010 16:07 UTC

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Date: Fri, 05 Nov 2010 11:07:09 -0500
From: Marsh Ray <marsh@extendedsubset.com>
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To: Florian Weimer <fweimer@bfk.de>
References: <4CC765D6.6020704@KingsMountain.com> <1288145780.6053.50.camel@mattlaptop2.local> <1288147744.6053.51.camel@mattlaptop2.local> <1288238488.2016.17.camel@mattlaptop2.local> <821v70m5i9.fsf@mid.bfk.de>
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Cc: IETF TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Connection diversion to other subdomains
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On 11/05/2010 05:25 AM, Florian Weimer wrote:
> * Matt McCutchen:
>
>> I looked through my browser history for registered domains containing a
>> TLS web server bearing a wildcard certificate and another subdomain on a
>> different IP address.  In almost all cases, the server was willing to
>> send me wrong content when I asked for the other subdomain via SNI and
>> HTTP Host.  Strictly speaking, this is a vulnerability.  Usually the
>> effect is just goofy, though on one major web site which I won't name,
>> it led to XSS.
>
> How is this even possible given that browsers do not send such crafted
> requests?

DNS poisoning or any other means of TCP redirection.

- Marsh