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Re: [TLS] TLS Client Puzzles

Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> Thu, 09 July 2015 03:25 UTC

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Date: Wed, 08 Jul 2015 20:25:05 -0700
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Brian Sniffen <bsniffen@akamai.com>
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS Client Puzzles
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On Jul 7, 2015 8:17 AM, "Brian Sniffen" <bsniffen@akamai.com> wrote:
>
>
> > At these rates you saturate gigabit ethernet connections, which
> > puzzles will not help with. In fact, they will make the problem worse.
>
> It's now normal to deploy one 10GbE NIC per CPU.  CPU load is definitely
> still the bottleneck.

There is still going to be a bottleneck somewhere. The only question is can
you serve more clients than an attacker can muster: plenty of zombies can
solve puzzles.

>
> > What about improving performance? That avoids any protocol changes,
> > and brings about the benefits you seem to want.
>
> By all means!  But it'll take 10-20 years to get those performance
> benefits out to the ends of the Earth.  I hope we can have some
> conversations using that technology in 2-5 years, but we should expect
> to be supporting RSA-2048 at least through 2025 (or a few years after
> it's discovered to be broken), and NIST curves through 2030.

Why is deploying puzzles more likely to happen then faster crypto?

>
> I'm not happy (or sad) about those dates, but if we think we're going to
> go faster than final death of SSLv2, MD5, and similar, we should be able
> to explain why that would be.
>
> -Brian

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