Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-02.txt

[Alfredo Pironti <[e-mail]>]

Dear list,

I've updated the session-hash and extended master secret draft, according
to the feedback received on this mailing list and at the latest interim
meeting in Paris. With respect to the previous version, I've made the
following changes:

- removed support for SSL 3.0
- populated the "security considerations" section
- minor editorial improvements

As the I-D submission tool is unavailable now, I've made a copy of
draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-03.txt available at [1]. The link will become
invalid as soon as the draft will be pushed on the IETF servers.

Best,
Alfredo

[1]
https://owncloud.pironti.eu/public.php?service=files&t=ffff684c90daea4a7b2327647e000d75&download

On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 3:16 PM, <[e-mail]> wrote:

>
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories.
>  This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security Working Group
> of the IETF.
>
>         Title           : Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Hash and
> Extended Master Secret Extension
>         Authors         : Karthikeyan Bhargavan
>                           Antoine Delignat-Lavaud
>                           Alfredo Pironti
>                           Adam Langley
>                           Marsh Ray
>         Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-02.txt
>         Pages           : 9
>         Date            : 2014-10-06
>
> Abstract:
>    The Transport Layer Security (TLS) master secret is not
>    cryptographically bound to important session parameters such as the
>    client and server identities.  Consequently, it is possible for an
>    active attacker to set up two sessions, one with a client and another
>    with a server, such that the master secrets on the two sessions are
>    the same.  Thereafter, any mechanism that relies on the master secret
>    for authentication, including session resumption, becomes vulnerable
>    to a man-in-the-middle attack, where the attacker can simply forward
>    messages back and forth between the client and server.  This
>    specification defines a TLS extension that contextually binds the
>    master secret to a log of the full handshake that computes it, thus
>    preventing such attacks.
>
>
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-session-hash/
>
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-02
>
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-02
>
>
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
> submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>
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