[TLS] DTLS 1.3 AEAD additional data

[Hanno Becker <[e-mail]>]

Hi all,

To my understanding, DTLS 1.3 defines AEAD additional data for record protection
as the record header as seen on the wire. Quoting Draft 37, Section 4:

```
   The entire header value shown in Figure 4 (but prior to record number
   encryption) is used as as the additional data value for the AEAD
   function.  For instance, if the minimal variant is used, the AAD is 2
   octets long.  Note that this design is different from the additional
   data calculation for DTLS 1.2 and for DTLS 1.2 with Connection ID.
```

I would like to suggest that DTLS 1.3 uses a structured representation
of the record header instead, as do all other versions of [D]TLS as
far as I understand.

The reasons for this are as follows, in decreasing order of
my perception of importance:

- Omission of Connection ID

  Regarding the presence of Connection IDs in multiple records within
  a single datagram, Draft 37 says:

```
   Implementations which send multiple records in the same datagram
   SHOULD omit the connection id from all but the first record;
   receiving implementations MUST assume that any subsequent records
   without connection IDs belong to the same assocatiation.
```

  This means that the Connection ID for non-initial records in a
  datagram containing multiple records is _not_ part of the AEAD
  additional data for those records, which seems wrong. Concretely,
  one could inject such non-initial records into other datagrams
  using different CIDs, and the record protection wouldn't notice it.

  One might argue that CID shouldn't be part of the AEAD in the first
  place, but in any case, I believe the treatment should be uniform
  and not distinguish between initial and non-initial records in
  a datagram.

- Modularity

  Decoupling the wire-presentation of the record header from
  record protection allows to implement record protection and
  the choice of record header independently: One piece of
  the implementation can take care of record protection -
  using the structured presentation of the record header - while
  another takes care of the wire-encoding. It is even possible
  to change the record header format in transit.

  One might of course turn this argument around and say that
  such modifications are unwanted and using the header on-the-wire
  as the AEAD allows to detect them, but I don't yet see the
  concrete problem with them so far.

- Simplicity

  At first it seems that using the record header as an
  unstructured binary blob for AEAD makes things simpler,
  but I don't think this is the case: Prior to record
  decryption, the record sequence number needs to be
  decrypted, and for that purpose, the record header already
  has to be parsed. Hence, at the time of record decryption,
  the record header is already be present a modified, structured
  form, and retaining the corresponding modified binary form
  appears to create additional complexity which would be
  avoided if record protection would use the structured
  header presentation.

- Uniformity with other [D]TLS versions


Let me know what you think,

Best,
Hanno

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