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Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-01.txt and DTLS

Marsh Ray <marsh@extendedsubset.com> Mon, 30 November 2009 18:06 UTC

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Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2009 12:06:02 -0600
From: Marsh Ray <marsh@extendedsubset.com>
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To: Michael Tüxen <Michael.Tuexen@lurchi.franken.de>
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Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-01.txt and DTLS
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Michael Tüxen wrote:
> 
> If I'm not wrong, then the attack which works against TLS does not
> work against DTLS, since DTLS has an epoch counter.
> 
> If a client tries to establish a DTLS connection and a MITM intercepts
> it, establishes itself a DTLS connection, the epoch is 1. There will be
> a final mismatch in the epoch and the packets will be discarded. When
> using the RI extension one could enforce the sending of the alert message.
> But the original attack is not possible, I think.
> 
> Is my analysis correct or am I overlooking something?

Can MitM do the same number of renegotitations as he does with the
server before splicing him?

- Marsh

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